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Abstract 
 
Title of Dissertation:   Comparative Assessment of the ISM Code and the 
     Tanker Management and Self Assessment (TMSA) 
impact on the tanker industry 
 
Degree:      MSc 
 
 
This study is concerned with the impact of two safety management tools; the first 
tool is the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, which is a legislative 
instrument that is applicable to almost the whole of the shipping industry, the second 
management tool is the Tanker Management and Self Assessment (TMSA) guide. 
This voluntary guide is an initiative of the Oil Companies International Marine 
Forum (OCIMF) that was first published in 2004. 
 
These two management tools are fundamentally different; in addition, TMSA has 
built on the implementation of the ISM Code, yet both of them are fundamentally a 
safety management standard that has a noticeable difference in approach and 
application. These differences are the focus of this study. 
 
This study has been divided into two parts; the first part was largely based on the 
literature review for this study. This part contains an analytical discussion on selected 
issue related to the topic of this study. This part introduces the fundamentals of safety 
management tools, explores the role of key players in the tanker industry and 
examines the merits of internal auditing of the ISM Code and the fundamentals of 
TMSA, which is the self-assessment exercise. 
 
The second part of this study outlines the methodology and describes the procedures 
followed for the data collection for this study, this was based on a questionnaire 
designed and distributed in order to attain the industries attitude towards TMSA and 
the ISM Code, following the same comparative assessment approach. 
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The dissertation closes with conclusions drawn from the investigations of this study 
and outlines a number of recommendations on how could the implementation of 
safety management standards be improved.  
 
The views expressed in this study are those of the author and not attributed to any 
organisation unless otherwise indicated. 
 
KEYWORDS:  
 
Tanker management and self-assessment, TMSA, International Safety Management 
Code, ISM, continues improvement. Quality Management System, OCIMF, 
INTERTANKO, Tanker Management, Safety Management System. 
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Part one 
1. Introduction, scope and objectives of the Study 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The introduction of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code was 
considered a paradigm shift for the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 
terms of its approach to safety standards of shipping. At present, a considerable 
sector of shipping companies combine the practical implementation of the Code with 
observing the requirements of other voluntary Quality Management Systems (QMS). 
Many of these initiatives are industry-based initiatives. 
 
This project is a comparative assessment of the impact of two safety management 
tools; the first tool is the ISM Code and the second is the Tanker Management and 
Self Assessment (TMSA) guide. This voluntary guide is an initiative of the Oil 
Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) that was first published in 2004.  
 
More projects have attempted to study the impact and effectiveness of the ISM Code 
in reducing the number of marine accidents as well as the promotion of a safety 
culture. These initiatives covered a range of areas, such as; the United Kingdom 
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) recent study titled ‘Effectiveness of the 
ISM Code in the UK Fleet and its Influence on the Development of a Safety Culture 
in the Commercial Shipping Industry. In that study the MCA concluded that a self-
assessment toolkit for assessing the safety culture on non-tanker vessels should be 
developed – similar to TMSA. (ReportISM, May 2008a) (Lappalainen, 2008) 
 
Another study of similar nature, which made a reference to the tanker industry 
accidents, was a study by Bassiouni (2003) titled ‘The impact of ISM Code on 
marine oil spills – Empirical study’. This study concluded that the ISM Code played 
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a very small role in decreasing the oil spills and that industry initiatives will play a 
dominant part in oil spill prevention and response in the future. (Bassiouni, 2003) 
 
 
At this time, the wider shipping community had almost 10 years of experience with 
the ISM Code, additionally, in the last 5 years a sector of the shipping industry (the 
tanker industry) had round about 5 years of experience with a voluntary guide to 
management best practices that built upon the ISM Code to further improve on the 
quality of management of safety and environment protection. This industry is of 
great importance due its considerable size and the sensitivity of its cargo. 
 
Consequently, it is hard to ignore the current level of experience of that important 
sector of the shipping industry with these two totally different management tools. 
This is worth a closer look and deeper analysis in an attempt to draw up lessons from 
the manner in which the shipping industry has reacted to both of these tools and to 
comparatively assess the effectiveness of their application.  
 
Studies and experiences show that without “embedding the safety, quality and 
maritime environmental protection culture” with in the company, external audits can 
have a limited effect on the ship’s safety and prevention of pollution (Turker & Er, 
2008), external audits are usually part of a regulatory regime, therefore, drawing up 
lessons from this experience is essential to determine how the regulatory instruments 
could benefit from the industries confirmation to voluntary management tools.  
 
Furthermore, the author is of the opinion that In the current economic scenario, it is 
at least possible that safety standards could suffer from economic downturn, as this 
could affect every aspect of safety at sea, from the practical application of safety 
measures and standards onboard ships to the safety culture of the whole shipping 
company. Some difficulties as a direct result to the current economic downturn has 
been highlighted by Koren (2009), a particular reference was made to the charterers 
increased freedom and ability to “pick and choose” 
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At least, management commitment and the priority of safety management standards 
and environmental protection measures could be lowered in favour of cost cutting, 
profit maximizing or simply striving to save the company’s mere existence during 
the current economic hardship. Hence, deciding on this time to conduct a study on 
the impact of two safety management systems on the shipping industry. This could 
proactively inspire changes to any weaknesses in the current regime to improve on 
safety management of the shipping industry in spite of the current economical 
hardship.  
 
A particular key feature of this project, which deserves urgent explanation at this 
stage, is the ambiguous attempt recognized in the title of the research topic that is to 
compare and evaluate the approach and impact of two entirely different management 
tools. 
 
This might lead to the understanding that the author is assuming a relationship 
between these two management tools and is attempting to explicate or establish the 
existence of this relationship. To the contrary, the aim of this research is not to 
establish or explain any connection or link between these two management tools but 
to study their current co-existence in a sector of the maritime industry together with 
any lessons that could be learned from that reality. 
 
Not withstanding the above, TMSA and ISM are fundamentally different from each 
other, while the ISM Code is a legally binding instrument; the TMSA is a guidance 
tool. Additionally, the ISM Code is applicable to a much larger sector of the shipping 
industry than the current application of TMSA and the current level of experience 
with TMSA is only half of that with the ISM Code. A closer look into these 
differences will be further discussed in this study.  
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However, other than the fact that TMSA has built upon the ISM Code, it is not the 
scope of this study to explore this relationship further.  If at the end of this study an 
actual relationship between some elements of these two management tools is 
formulated; it should emerge as a by-product of this research and it is left to the 
conclusion of the reader. Establishing an affiliation between the ISM Code and the 
TMSA is a problematical workload that exceeds the scope of this study, that is 
because establishing such a relationship will require an intensive qualitative-
quantitative approach which is very resource demanding endeavour.  
 
1.2. Scope of Study 
 
To better understand the comparative nature of this paper, one of the objectives of 
this paper is to attempt to answer the question what is the need for TMSA? Why did 
a large sector of the shipping industry together with their respective customers feel 
the need for a specific guidance to improve on their safety management system 
beyond what is called the minimum compliance of ISM. 
 
The focal point of this study will be a focus on TMSA rather than attempting to 
compare the two management tools on the same level. Consequently, TMSA rather 
than the ISM Code will be the focus of almost every explanatory or descriptive 
section of this paper. 
 
The incentive behind this approach is that the vast majority of authoritative 
references, such as books, research papers and studies (academic or otherwise) have 
been on the ISM Code (details and outcomes of some studies are addressed in this 
study). Naturally, due to the previously mentioned differences between the two, 
TMSA did not receive consideration in any comparable size, depth or academic 
value. 
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Additionally, the knowledge and experience of the shipping community with the 
ISM Code is wider and deeper than with TMSA. Even shipping companies that have 
been confirming to TMSA since its launch, do not have more than 5 years of 
experience with it as compared to the almost 10 years they had to comply with the 
ISM Code. 
 
A number of studies, such as (Bassiouni, 2003) and (Mejia, 2001), attempted to link 
the implementation of the ISM Code to the rate of accidents, oil spills or Port State 
Control (PSC) findings or detentions. These studies have commented on the 
difficulty to separate the effect of the ISM Code implementation from the effect of 
other technical safety measures and regulations. Therefore, since TMSA has built on 
ISM Code, it is difficult to quantify the effect of each one of them independently; 
hence, this study will only discuss specific elements of these two management tools. 
 
Furthermore, an entire focus on TMSA’s approach and impact alone was not aimed 
for. It was not aspired to examine the similarities of these two instruments or any 
elements either in objective or in approach they might share, but it was decided that 
this study will attempt to explore the distinctive features of the approach of each of 
these management tools and to analyse the diversity of their impact on the shipping 
industry.  
  
When considering analyzing or assessing a safety management tool, one must 
consider a large number of aspects that determines if that management system is 
successful or not. Primarily, the objectives of that management system are to be 
taken into account.  
 
In order to achieve that, the objectives of the system must be measurable, since a 
number of studies (as previously mentioned) have concluded that an assessment of 
the impact of the ISM Code on the shipping industry by gathering hard data is 
extremely difficult and requires international cooperation, this study will attempt to 
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gauge the impact of the ISM Code and TMSA from the manner in which the industry 
have reacted to them and their attitude towards them.  
 
Based on the methodology followed in this approach, as will be further discussed in 
part two of this paper, it is the opinion of the author that approaching the assessment 
of TMSA in the same manner that the ISM Code was approached in deferent studies, 
would be beyond the capabilities of the author or the time allocated for this study and 
might at the end lead to the same reported serious limitations in any results achieved. 
 
1.3. Objectives 
 
This paper attempts to investigate the need for TMSA. Was there a weakness deemed 
in the ISM Code that TMSA was the remedy for? If true, how effective was the 
remedy? On the other hand, if the code itself was considered a sound basis for the 
TMSA being a guidance tool, then why did oil majors in particular find it necessary 
to place considerable commercial pressure on operators to confirm to this guide? 
 
This project acknowledges the different approaches, application and methodology of 
the two management tools. The ISM Code being a legislative tool has taken a certain 
approach to set up minimum standards for the safety management of shipping and 
introduce what is termed a safety culture. 
 
While the TMSA is documented not to be considered as replacement of the ISM 
Code, it builds on it and provide a systematic approach that encourages ship 
operators to move beyond the so called minimum compliance culture. 
 
Although these two aims are fundamentally different, in addition to the very different 
methodology each tool implies, both of these tools comprise an ambition to improve 
the process of safety management based on the theory that if the safety management 
standard is raised the safety performance will follow. 
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Therefore, this paper aspires to identify the differences between the approaches of 
the ISM Code and TMSA, the impact of their implementation and the effectives of 
both in improving the safety culture of a company. 
 
By reviewing and analysing the impact of the TMSA on the Tanker industry, since 
the ISM Code and the TMSA have been simultaneously applicable to the tanker 
industry alone, the commitment, competence and attitudes of individuals at all levels 
will be considered. 
 
The reaction of the industry to the introduction of ISM Code is well documented and 
studied, similarly, the industries attitude towards the Code has be exploited in a 
number of studies. Therefore, this paper is a modest attempt to shed some light on 
the reaction of the industry to the introduction of TMSA tool as compared to the 
reaction of the industry to the introduction of the ISM Code. 
 
In addition, was the introduction of TMSA the long sought after solution, required by 
legislators and the industry alike, to improve the safety management systems of 
shipping? If so, how effective was it in attempting that important purpose and what is 
the potential of applying this approach to the shipping industry in its entirety?  
 
Finally, better understanding of the current regime may well allow the drawing up of 
lessons from the impact that these two tools have had on the shipping industry. This 
is in an effort to determine the most suitable path towards a uniform approach that 
will ultimately make our ships safer and our environment better protected.  
 
1.4. Overview of methodology 
 
The methodology followed in this paper is not by any means far from the mainstream 
of studies that has been conducted on similar areas of study, in particular, studies that 
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have been conducted on the ISM Code impact and effectiveness, such as the study 
conducted by Anderson (2005). 
 
Individuals in the field of shipping management have already been through the 
introduction of ISM Code, some have been through the introduction of TMSA as 
well; others have even had almost 5 years of experience with TMSA. This wealth of 
experience and practical knowledge is of immense importance to a study that aims to 
examine the impact of ISM Code and TMSA. 
 
Previously mentioned studies have pointed out the importance these opinions in 
formulating a better understanding of the impact of management tools. This paper 
takes that into account, therefore, this paper is divided into two parts; the first part 
will initially present and review the subject of this research, discussions and analysis 
of topic with large dependence on the literature review conducted.  
 
Part two of this paper will present the results of a questionnaire exercise that was 
carried out to formulate a better understanding of the industry’s attitude and reaction 
towards the ISM Code and TMSA. Detailed description of all stages in that exercise 
together with some basic descriptive statistical analysis of the results achieved will 
be presented. 
 
 
Other opinion polls and benchmarking database, such as the International 
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) benchmarking 
database, have been used as well in this study. This was attempted to formulate a 
better understanding of the application status of TMSA. A detailed description of 
the methodology is described in chapter 5 of this paper. 
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2. Safety Management tools between quality and minimum standards: 
 
Reason (1991) has divided the safety concerns of safety measures and standards into 
three eras; the first era is the technical era, the focus then was on improving the 
standards of the technical components of the system. However, following major 
accidents where the human component of the system was clearly to blame, a clear 
shift into improving the standards of human element was realised. 
As per figure 1, Reason (1991) defines a third era, where the focus of safety 
measures and standards is on the management and organisational structure of the 
system. 
 
Figure 1 Three ages of safety concerns 
Source: Reason, J. (1991), The Reliability of Management in Decision Making, Seminar 
Reliability, The Risk of Management, IMechE, London. 
 
The ISM Code represents a paradigm shift in the attitude of regulators towards safety 
standards. This shift is now almost 10 years old; time does play a part in a changing 
of the common believe on what constitutes minimum standard and what constitutes 
quality, therefore, is the ISM Code only a minimum legislative standard to comply 
with or is it a quality system? 
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The answer to that question depends on the definition of the term quality. As cited by 
AL-Hamran (1999) There are many definitions for the term quality. However, almost 
all fall under two categories, the first one entails that quality is achieved if implied 
needs are met; the second one involves a measure of how effective these implied 
needs are met. 
 
If the first category of definition is considered, the ISM Code requirements sets out a 
quality system to differentiate between the good and the bad, i.e. the system is a pass 
or fail system where if the Safety Management System (SMS) of a specific company 
complies with the provisions of the Code it passes as a quality management system, 
otherwise it fails. 
 
On the other hand, considering the second category of definitions, TMSA provides 
for a measurement that quantifies how effective was the SMS (or the QMS of the 
company) in achieving the conditions of a quality management system. The measure 
is based on businesses best practices from the point of view of oil majors. 
 
Never the less, it might be possible to think of the Code as a form of quality 
assurance focused on safety requirements rather than commercial requirements 
(Bolivar, 1996) because it is the basis of a quality management system to be 
formulated by the company based on its specific needs as much as the TMSA is. 
 
The comparison that both management tools are the basis for a company specific 
quality management is worthy of evaluation, since the methodology used in both 
tools is different. TMSA is built with specific “clear-cut” guidance. These guidelines 
are measurable by key performance indicators whilst the ISM Code is a holistic 
general approach that should serve as the basis for the specific safety management of 
the company. 
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The previous discussion and any subsequent comparison ignored some basic facts. 
Such as the fact that TMSA has built upon ISM Code, only one sector of the shipping 
industry had experience with TMSA and that experience with TMSA is limited in 
time as well. 
 
Though, it might not be possible for a legislative instrument to define a quantifying 
measure of compliance. In the ISM Code case, any SMS should either comply with 
the ISM Code or fail to comply. On the other hand, guidance to the implementation 
provides direction towards a uniform interpretation of the code. 
 
Nonetheless, even if the ISM Come implementation guidelines are not legally 
binding, and even if they are basically directed to flag states to form a homogeneous 
interpretation of the system, these guidelines could be translated into measurable 
practical steps to fulfil the legislative ISM Code requirement. This is not suggesting 
that the inclusion of a measurement system alone in a safety management tool will 
transform it into a more efficient tool. 
 
2.1. Historical background of ISM and TMSA 
 
This historical background examines the motives behind each of the ISM Code and 
TMSA; this attempt is to develop a better understanding of the objectives of these 
two instruments and what symptoms of failure were these two instruments the 
response for. 
 
It is well known that in the mid 1980s there was an explosion in the amount of 
maritime insurance claims, a rise of 200-400% in insurance claims was reported. 
That claim was combined with a number of maritime accidents were a large number 
of lives lost, particularly the capsizing of the Herald of the Free Enterprise in 1987, a 
predominant feature of these accident was that human error was a set factor in almost 
all of these accidents. Another feature dominated the accident investigation reports; 
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the maritime community (legislators in particular) was concerned that there was a 
serious lack of a comprehensive management system in regard to organizational 
safety. (Anderson, 2005) 
 
With regard to TMSA, the originating body of TMSA is the Oil Companies 
International Marine Forum (OCIMF), the role of OCIMF will be further illustrated 
later in this study, however, OCIMF is a voluntary association of oil companies 
having an interest in the shipment and what is called “terminalling” of crude oil and 
oil products.  
 
Although TMSA was promoted as a proactive approach towards safety and as an 
industry initiative to be self-governed, there is evidence of other historical 
motivations behind the introduction of TMSA. 
 
Starting with The grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon in 1967 that was a shock to 
the maritime industry, the political system and the public at large. The severe 
environmental consequences of the accident marked the beginning of a much 
stronger focus on the environmental aspects of shipping, a focus that ever since has 
increased in scope and strength. The tragic fact was that this catastrophe was a 
wholly human made accident. (Kristiansen, 2005) 
 
Although many safety and environmental protection rules and regulations are 
attributed to the grounding of the Torrey Canyon, a more recent trace of increased 
public awareness of marine pollution, in particular oil pollution, is attributed to the 
sinking of the oil tanker Erika on December of 1999, with the loss of some 20,000 
tonnes of heavy fuel oil into the sea, the Erika was charted by the company Total, a 
European oil major company, and classed by Rina, which is a European 
Classification Society. 
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The findings of the French court ruling on the loss of the Erika and resultant 
pollution included an implied criticism of the charterer's tanker vetting process 
(Knowles, 2008). This implied criticism was towards a voluntary practice, preformed 
out of the due diligence of the charterer, that practice was deemed inadequate at 
providing the charterer with the best holistic picture of the safety management of the 
company in order to make a decision on whether the ship is to be charted or not. 
 
2.2. Making the case for TMSA 
 
As stated on OCIMF’s TMSA website at (http://tmsa2.ocimf-tmsa.com), the “TMSA 
programme provides ship operators with a means to improve and measure their own 
management systems. The programme encourages ship operators to assess their 
safety management systems against listed performance indicators. The results from 
these assessments can then be used to develop an improvement plan, using the stages 
of attainment described in the programme, to achieve safety and environmental 
excellence” 
 
TMSA was promoted as being a tool that is Methodical, systematic and structured in 
its approach. Considerable emphasis on the structure of the TMSA was given. Many 
vessel operators have already welcomed TMSA due to the benefits it has given them, 
as it provides a useful framework for improving their management systems on a 
continuous basis. (Allport, 2009) additionally, the TMSA also helps operators 
understand what are the expectations of the charterers and vetting inspectors.  
 
Moreover, one of the motives behind the introduction of TMSA is the lack of 
confidence of charterers in the certification process of the ISM Code, i.e. if the 
certification process will provide an evidence of the “quality” of the implementation 
process. ISM may show that a management system is available, but there is no 
indication of the quality and content of the system and its effective application 
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(Luke, 2005) and TMSA also provides some sort of evidence to the charterer that the 
operator is in full compliance with the requirements of the ISM Code. (Allport, 2009) 
 
When examining the objectives of TMSA stated in the guidance itself, as well as the 
introduction papers and information papers particularly published by OCIMF, one 
can identify a large number of features that are specific in some way to TMSA. 
Instead of identifying all of these features (which might be shared with other 
initiatives) the author is of the opinion that identifying the features that have been 
reported by companies in TMSA seminars, mainly sponsored by Tanker Operator 
and INTERTANKO (Some are reported in the list of references), as to their 
experience with the guidance is of more practical value. Therefore the following 
paragraph will list some features these features.  
 
Many companies have commented on the proactive approach of TMSA, they have 
stated that their experience with the guidance have not only encouraged the company 
to identify operational risks and lowering them to an acceptable level but also to 
move beyond the minimum requirements by providing the company with clear 
guidance. 
 
This in turn, should shift the culture of the company from minimum compliance to 
meeting the industry expectations and operating in a best practice orientation, 
helping the management of the company to aim for excellence in environmental 
protection and safety management. 
 
As well, TMSA is based on self-assessment; this is an essential pillar of the 
guidance, which also aids the understanding of the nature of the guidance as well as 
its orientation. Therefore, the fact that TMSA is a self-motivated business model for 
continues monitoring and improvement will be independently addressed later in this 
study. 
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Nevertheless, two more features of TMSA, more than often, have been reported as of 
particular aid to the company, the first feature is that the TMSA was an aid for the 
company in it is decision for resources allocation process. This in fact is a product of 
the gap analysis part of the guidance; TMSA enables the company to recognize the 
level of their conformance to the guidance scores based on the achievement of KPIs. 
 
Thus, enabling the company to identify current gaps between their current level of 
conformance and their desired level. That in turn, will serve as a planning tool for the 
company to achieve their desired level of conformance where the allocation of 
resources is an essential part of the planning process.  Recourses can be focused and 
directed towards identified areas of weakness. Vessel operators can use their 
assessment results to develop a phased improvement plan that improves safety and 
environmental performance. (OCIMF, 2008) 
 
The second feature is the encouragement that TMSA encompasses, which serves as 
an aid for the company in complying with and confirming to a number of legislative 
requirements as well as business standards such as the ISM Code itself, ISO 9001, 
14001, 18001, customer quality expectations and the company’s own values and 
targets. 
 
From the charterers’ point of view, again based upon charterers’ participation in 
TMSA Seminars, TMSA may achieve a standard framework for the assessment of 
the safety management system of the company, this is an identified weakness of the 
previous vetting regime as it was criticised for providing a momentary “snapshot” 
judgement of the tanker operator. The industry saw that there is a need for more 
safeguards for vetting and chartering above the both ISM and SIRE. This need arises 
from the criticism that tanker operators do not apply requirements of the ISM code 
properly. (Turker & Er, 2008) 
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2.3. Overview of TMSA and its methodology 
 
The guide itself is in four parts; part one introduces the system, while part two 
describes the application of the guidelines and implementation and part three, which 
is the heart of TMSA, contains the 12 elements of the TMSA guidelines, they are 
listed as follows: 
Element 1  Management, leadership and accountability  
Element 2  Recruitment and management of shore-based personnel  
Element 3  Recruitment and management of vessel personnel  
Element 4  Reliability and maintenance standards  
Element 5  Navigational safety  
Element 6  Cargo, ballast and mooring operations  
Element 7  Management of change  
Element 8  Incident investigation and analysis  
Element 9  Safety management  
Element 10  Environmental management  
Element 11  Emergency preparedness and contingency planning  
Element 12  Measurement, analysis and improvement  
Part four of the guidelines contains glossary of key terms and phrases. 
Each element contains guidance on best practice structured as follows:  
• The title indicates the fundamental area of management practice 
• The main objective defines the goal to be achieved 
• The supporting paragraphs within the elements explain how vessel operators can 
achieve the main objective. These are activities that diligent operators will either 
have already included or would wish to include within their management 
systems. 
• Each element defines the Aim and KPIs required to meet the main objective, 
together with guidance on how this objective should be achieved. 
• Individual KPIs within the elements provide an objective measurement of the 
standards currently delivered by the operator’s management system. Vessel 
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operators may wish to use the best-practice guidance to achieve the standards 
outlined in the KPIs. (OCIMF, 2008) 
 
The methodology of confirming to TMSA is illustrated and self explanatory in figure 
2 presented in the guidelines. 
 
Figure 2 TMSA, key steps for the measurement processes 
Source: Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) (2008) Tanker Management 
and Self Assessment (TMSA) Guide, London, UK. 
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2.4. Value of TMSA 
 
The shipping industry has been through three eras where there was a distinctive 
culture that dominated each era. According to the guidelines on the application of the 
ISM Code, published by the International Shipping Federation and the International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the first era was dominated by a blame culture, where 
the essential theme was to identify failure and then to apportion blame accordingly. 
(ICS/ISF, 1996) 
 
The second stage is the culture of compliance where a set of rules and regulations 
were prescribed for the industry. In this culture, rules were a mean in them selves and 
they provided the means to achieve safety. The third era, which the industry partially 
has achieved, but aspirers to achieve in its entirety, is the culture of self-regulation. 
The means that provided for this culture have been active in the industry for a long 
time, namely the ISM Code. The ISM Code provisions encourage individual 
companies to set up their own set of rules and regulations based upon the risks that 
have been identified by them. (ICS/ISF, 1996) 
 
This exercise is of great importance because the identification of hazards on vessel-
by-vessel basis, which is based on the specific risk elements that a particular vessel is 
exposed to, is far more beneficial and practical when compliance is to be encouraged. 
Essential motivations are the “continuous” learning phase where each company has 
to identify risks associated with their operations and develop company, or even 
vessel, specific barriers against the realization of such risks. 
 
The problem arises where that actual compliance with the provisions of the code was 
the end mean in itself for some in the industry. In other words, some companies had 
the same compliance attitude towards the code as they did towards other technical 
safety measures. Reportedly, that was because they did not understand the code, did 
not see the Code as an opportunity to improve their safety management system or 
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they lacked the commitment to do so. 
 
This attitude from some companies was evident in a number of observations, such as 
the acquiring of what is called “off the shelf SMS”, as well as the limitations and the 
narrow approach of some SMS. Whether or not, this problem still exists in the 
shipping industry is debatable depending upon the sector of the shipping industry 
examined, i.e. the top performing companies or the bottom end of the spectrum. 
 
On the other hand, the developers of TMSA are certainly of the opinion that it does. 
The support for such a claim is that many experts see that two essential aspects 
where missing in the implementation of the ISM Code, the first one; is the need for 
continues improvement and the second one is the genuine commitment from the 
senior management, TMSA was considered as the missing link for the needed 
upgrading of the “compliance-based” ISM Code, fully in line with the self regulation 
culture, as predicted by ISF/ICS (Sagen, 2007). Operators, who have implemented 
ISM, in its true spirit, will find at least the first 2 stages of TMSA very parallel to 
their current ISM applications. (Turker & Er, 2008) 
 
Nonetheless, TMSA scores do not encompass the findings from other sources. Even 
though these findings are usually lagging indicators of the safety condition of the 
company or the ship, they are still valuable indicators. These indicators include, 
Inspections results, terminal reports, PSC detentions and incident history.  
 
The charterer needs to obtain this information from other channels in order to make 
an informed business decision based on leading and lagging indicators (TMSA is 
seen as encompassing many leading indicators). Other immediate sources are the 
Ship and Barge Inspection Report Exchange (SIRE) inspection reports, which are 
readily visible to charterers on OCIMF’s website. 
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2.5. Features of the tanker industry 
 
Exploring the motivation behind TMSA is the same as studying the drive for a 
quality service in the industry. It is a general view that the majority of the world’s 
fleet are safely management; it is the minority that is of concern to regulators as well 
as charterers. This minority is significant in number and a single accident could have 
very serious consequences, especially to the tanker industry. These serious 
consequences will take either the form of public opinion pressure and most of the 
time subsequent political pressure. In addition, the financial liability arising from a 
single accident is enormous. Commercial reality and pressure, reputation of the 
charterer as well (protection) of the reputation of the charterers are a basic motive 
behind the introduction of the vetting program and subsequently the introduction of 
TMSA. 
 
There are many considerations, other than TMSA level, that are taken into 
consideration when making a chartering decision by the oil majors. However, it is 
understandable that as the exposure to the charterer increases they are looking for a 
higher level of conformance. The exposure will increase by spot charter or short 
term, medium term and long term time charter. 
 
Taking a snapshot at the tanker industry performance in terms of accident, according 
to the maritime accident review of 2008 published by the European Maritime Safety 
Agency (EMSA, 2008), the total number of accident involving tankers of all types 
rose from 63 accident in 2007 to 73 accident in 2008 which equated to 11% of the 
total number of accident (as compared to 8% in 2007). Similarly, the number of lives 
lost in 2008 rose to 9 from the reported 3 cases of 2007. A comparison between the 
tanker industry and other industries is illustrated in figure 3. 
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Figure 3 EMSA maritime accident review of 2008 
Source: EMSA (2008). Maritime Accident Review 2008. European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA). Retrieved August 1, 2009, from the World Wide Web: 
https://extranet.emsa.europa.eu/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=159&
Itemid=193. 
 
2.6. Key players in the tanker industry and TMSA 
 
OCIMF deserves to be the first key player to be discussed in the context of this 
study; its mission, as stated on (http://www.ocimf.com/), is to be the foremost 
authority on the safe and environmentally responsible operation of oil tankers and 
terminals, promoting continuous improvement in standards of design and operation. 
OCIMF was formed at a meeting in London on 8 April 1970 and currently comprises 
72 companies worldwide, it reported that more that 900 operators are registered in 
the OCIMF-TMSA website  
 
The SIRE program is controlled by OCIMF. All companies’ input/extract factual 
ship inspection reports (SIRE) from OCIMF database, there is no indication of pass, 
fail, rating or other assessment of ship acceptability provided in the database. Ship 
operator can make comments on each report and submit these to SIRE where then 
they become part of the report that is accessible to OCIMF members, Bulk oil 
Maritime Accident Review 20088  |  Summary of the 2008 Results 
carriers. The great majority of commercial ships 
fall into this category. Consequently, it is no 
surprise that this was also by far the biggest 
category for shipping accidents in and around 
EU waters in 2008, with almost 41% of the total 
EU vessel accidents recorded (down from around 
45% in 2007).  General cargo ships accounted 
for almost 77% of the cargo ship accident total, 
while bulk carriers accounted for almost 13% 
and vehicle carriers for around 10%. A very large 
proportion of general cargo ships, and many 
bulk and vehicle carriers, are in the 500-5000 
gt range and the majority of the vessels were 
involved in collisions/contacts and groundings, 
which accounted for around 39% and 37% of 
the accident total in this category respectively 
(down from around 40% and 33% in 2007).
The figures showed 307 cargo ships involved in 
accidents in 2008 (down from 330 in 2007). They 
also recorded that 10 general cargo ships sank 
(in comparison with 11 in 2007) but no bulk or 
vehicle arriers went down. 24 people died in 
accidents on cargo ships (up from 20 in 2007). 
The number of accidents involving refrigerated 
vessels was very small.
While the great majority of vessel accidents do 
not result in serious consequences, there were 
one or two each month during 2008 which were 
significantly worse than the rest, and these are 
highlighted in Chapter 2.
1.3 Breakdown by Ship Type
1.3.1 Cargo Ships (General Cargo Ships, 
          Bulk Carriers and Vehicle Carriers)
The cargo ships category includes general and 
refrigerated cargo ships, bulk carriers and vehicle 
General Cargo Ships
Tankers
Container Ships
Passenger Ships
Fishing Vessels
Other Vessel Types
41%
11%
9%
8%
11%
18%
2008 Accidents by Ship Type
Note: percentages per vessel type have been rounded down, hence the total of 98%.
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terminal operators, Tanker charterers and oil traders and Government bodies. Figure 
4 demonstrates the size, frequency and development of the SIRE program. 
 
Figure 4 SIRE reports received and requested per month 
OCIMF (2009, June). OCIMF annual report 2009. Retrieved August 1, 2009, from the 
World Wide Web: http://www.ocimf.com/view_document.cfm?id=1289. 
 
Although schemes of vetting processes vary from company to company, as well as 
with in the same system due to company size, scope, diversity of activities, attitude 
to marine risk, use of real time information, quality of analysis and the use 3
rd
 party 
vetting, According to (Luke, 2005) from Chevron Shipping, the most common 
reason for rejecting vessels is perceived management and compliance weaknesses 
within a company, not vessel-specific equipment “Deficiencies”. 
 
The second key player is INTERTANKO, INTERTANKO is the International 
Association of Independent Tanker Owners established in the 1970’s; it is a forum, 
which comprises 270 members, operating 3100 tankers and some 300 associate 
members. Membership is open to independent owners and operators of oil and 
chemical tankers, i.e. non-oil companies and non-state controlled tanker owners. 
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The support and size of membership of INTERTANKO allows it to issue statements 
on behalf of the industry and participate in international meetings and forums, it is 
represented in the IMO where it has a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
status, the International Oil Spill Compensation Fund (IOPC) and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) where it has a consultative status 
as well. 
 
INTERTANKO passes the recommendation of its members through TMSA working 
group within INTERTANKO and as a result some changes to the 2008 edition of 
TMSA has been based upon these recommendations. This establishes that there is a 
dialogue between the oil majors and tanker operators at least on an organisational 
level. 
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3. Practical application & impact of TMSA and ISM 
 
Many tanker operators still misunderstand TMSA, it seems, seeing it the same way 
as they saw all the other initiatives (ISM, ISO), with more procedures and forms to 
complete, more inspections and proving things have been done, while the ships are 
operated similarly to before. (Tanker Operator, 2006a). 
 
It could be argued that the need to introduce the ISM Code arose from the number of 
incident where root causes lies in the management practices of the company that 
either have encouraged a failure of the system or that the system did not offer enough 
barriers to protect against failures, consequently, the ISM Code was introduced to 
achieve those results. 
 
Subsequently, Port State Control (PSC) inspectors had at their disposal a legislative 
tool through where they could then inspect the management system rather than just 
going around the ship counting hardware deficiencies or the carriage of correct 
certificates onboard. 
 
Nonetheless, looking at TMSA development, the system of inspections was already 
in place, oil majors were practicing their due diligence to select an operator of a 
certain quality by carrying out an inspection of the ship. Currently, the results of the 
self-assessment will be considered alongside the ship inspection report the decision 
to accept or reject an operator will not be entirely based upon a snap picture 
judgment as the leading indicators recommended by the TMSA guidelines provide 
sufficient information to assess the risk associated with use of those operators’ 
vessels. (Allport, 2009) 
 
They (the Key Performance Indicators KPI of the guidelines) also provide a valued 
determination of whether they have effective control processes implemented, not 
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only to justify acceptance for spot or term business, but also to deliver a sustained 
level of safety and environmental excellence. (Allport, 2009) 
 
3.1. Application to shore based management 
 
Confirming to TMSA is an immense undertaking that requires the company to 
measure, collect evidence and confirm to some 250 Key Performance Indicators. 
However, the majority of these tasks needs to be completed only once, after that the 
TMSA cycle of continues improvement (which will be discussed later in this study) 
will begin and the company should realise the benefits of identifying areas of 
weakness, decide in actions to be taken to correct these weaknesses and then 
monitoring the effects of these actions.  
 
The industry realises that TMSA is a guideline that does not necessary mean the best 
for every company in every case. According to Mittal (2007) it should be 
remembered that these are guidelines based on commonly perceived ‘good 
management practices ’. These may not necessarily be the ‘best’ depending on the 
individual company’s needs and limitations. Some are therefore subject to individual 
interpretation (Mittal, 2007). Whether the charterers’ selections process and 
subsequent commercial pressure takes that into account is very much debatable. 
 
Operationally, SIRE reports and TMSA submitted reports are both examined by the 
charterers of TMSA for any inconsistencies or differences observed, if vetting 
inspectors carry out their inspections based upon the results of submitted TMSA 
reports then this might undermine the whole process of self-assessment.  
 
While senior management practically decision on the targeted level for each element 
is greatly influenced by the business needs of the company it is hard to say that the 
TMSA is a concept that is exclusively driven by core values of the company.  
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In addition, the decision to raise the level of a TMSA element might also be 
motivated by the desire of bringing this element to the same score as other TMSA 
elements. This is to achieve an even score across all TMSA elements, as the elements 
with a lower score will definitely standout. The same could be applied to KPIs within 
the element. 
 
Although some reportedly high scores have been entered in TMSA’s website, the 
industry eventually came to the understanding that this was not helpful. Some other 
companies have stretched their resources and aced towards confirming to TMSA due 
to the market reward attached to the confirmation to TMSA, others reported that the 
process have taken up to one year. NYK Shipmanagement reported that 2 Senior 
Executives were involved in the process for 9 months. 
 
According to (Anderson, 2005) there was a common complain with regard to the 
implementation of the ISM Code, this complain was the size of the paper work that 
the ISM Code requires and generates. TMSA did not escape such comments as an 
analysis presented by Ulysses Systems (UK) Ltd. demonstrated the increase in paper 
requirement for different initiatives (legal and voluntary). (Tanker operator, 2006b) 
Table 1 demonstrates the suggested increase in paperwork and administrative 
requirements in management tools as illustrated in a 2006 TMSA conference report 
(associated presentations). 
Table 1 Evolution of the information revolution 
Description ISM ISO9000 ISO14000 ISPS TMSA Total 
Tasks 1200 +100 +100 +50 +20 1470 
Roles 35 0 0 0 0 35 
Manual Sections 2000 +500 +500 + 150 +150 3300 
Forms Types 170 +20 +10 +10 +20 230 
Source: Tanker operator (2006a). TMSA warmly received in Athens. In TMSA Conference 
Athens. Retrieved June 19, 2009, from the World Wide Web: 
http://tankeroperator.com/pdfs/TMSAAthens.pdf. 
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3.2. The benchmarking process 
 
Benchmarking is defined as the process of comparing organizational performance 
and practices with others, preferably leaders in the same industry, for the purposes of 
identifying, understanding and adapting best practices from organizations anywhere 
in the world to help your organization improve its performance (OCIMF, 2008) 
 
Benchmarking is specifically mentioned in the following elements: 
• Element 1A, KPI of Stage 4 reads: Benchmarking is used to identify further 
improvements to the safety management system. 
• Element 10 Environmental management, KPI of stage 4 reads: Environmental 
performance is benchmarked across the fleet and against the oil/marine industry 
as a whole. 
 
INTERTANKO has established a benchmarking database (accessible to members at 
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx) for member companies to use in 
order to compare their KPI scores with other INTERTANKO members participating 
in the scheme. Examining this database could provide an idea on the status of 
confirmation to TMSA in the industry among members of INTERTANKO 
participating in the benchmarking scheme. The general picture of confirmation to 
TMSA was grouped by the author and provided in figure 5. 
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Figure 5 INTERTANKO benchmarking database as of 20
th
 Aug 09  
Source: INERTANKO (2009). Retrieved August 20, 2009 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx 
 
Assessing the data provided by INTERTANKO and examining the extremes at both 
ends, the following observations were made: 
 
Element 4B received the lowest average rating (2.33), lowest median (2) and the 
largest number of companies with rating 1 entries which represent 22% among all 
entries, it also received the least number of entries as rating 4 representing 12% of 
total entries for that element as per figure 6. 
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Figure 6 Element 4B ratings 
Source: INERTANKO (2009). Retrieved August 20, 2009 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx 
 
Element 4B is titled “Reliability and maintenance standards (Critical equipment)”. 
The aim of this element is Testing and planned maintenance of critical systems and 
equipment are always carried out as per the plan. Nonetheless, examining associated 
elements (elements of similar requirements), i.e. element 4 and 4A, it is observed that 
a different trend is shown in the conformance level to these elements. See Figure 5. 
 
The previous observation is worth noting when the requirements of section 10.3 and 
10.4 of the ISM Code “Maintenance of the ship and equipment” is considered, this 
section of the ISM Code states that: 
10.3 The Company should establish procedures in its safety management 
system to identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational 
failure of which may result in hazardous situations. The safety management 
system should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the 
reliability of such equipment or systems. These measures should include the 
regular testing of stand-by arrangements and equipment or technical systems 
that are not in continuous use. 
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10.4 The inspections mentioned in 10.2 as well as the measures referred to in 
10.3 should be integrated into the ship's operational maintenance routine. 
 
On the other hand, elements 11 and 11A have scored the highest average score (3.67) 
& (3.53) respectively, they are the only two elements with where the median is a 
rating of 4 and more than 72% of entries have submitted a rating of 4 as 
demonstrated in figure 7 and figure 8 respectively. 
 
Figure 7 Element 11 ratings 
Source: INERTANKO (2009). Retrieved August 20, 2009 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Element 11A ratings 
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Source: INERTANKO (2009). Retrieved August 20, 2009 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx 
 
Element 11 is titled “ Emergency preparedness and contingency planning” which 
aims to improve and test the vessel operators’ ability to respond to and manage an 
incident. Element 1A shares same title but aims to improve and test the ability of 
vessel operators to respond to an incident by holding regular and realistic emergency 
drills and exercises. 
Taking a holistic view over the previous data, it is noticeable that the overwhelming 
majority of 75 % of self-assessments are in rating 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 9 Majority of ratings 
Source: INERTANKO (2009). Retrieved August 20, 2009 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx 
 
3.3. Commercial impact 
 
TMSA has created a market reward for quality in safety and environmental 
management, this is necessary to move beyond that culture of mere compliance and 
create yet another strong motive for management to invest in safety and environment 
protection. Similarly, due to the benefit of confirming full conformance to ISM, the 
potential for significant cost reductions and the increased earnings from improved 
commercial opportunities. (Allport, 2009) 
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On the other hand, this is a fragile process where the motive to invest in safety 
management depends on how much are the oil majors welling to pay for quality, this 
in turn will determine how much operators will spend on quality. Whether TMSA 
will eliminate the market of substandard ships or drive them towards other sectors of 
the market, which oil majors do not control, is debatable. 
 
If the senior management is not focused on improving quality by determining and 
allocating recourses then the whole exercise will turn into a number filling contest. 
Because TMSA achieves measurable cost reductions, confirms ISM Code 
conformance and increases commercial opportunities (Allport, 2009). Oil 
companies’ use the score of the TMSA to establish the operator’s rating and 
determines the quality of services the shipping company is likely to provide, this is 
translated in real life as a commercial pressure by the. 
 
 
Although confirming to TMSA might represent an initial cost, mainly personnel 
training costs as reported by many operators, as well as time investment from senior 
management, this could be worth while if the picture matures and as reported that by 
recognising the benefits of TMSA, a number of Oil Majors have signalled that they 
would like to do away with vetting inspections, although to date they all still carry 
them out. (Allport, 2009) 
 
3.4. Legal impact 
 
The legal implications of the ISM Code are enormous; the Code will have a 
significant impact on the way in which a carrier’s liability is assessed in the event of 
a casualty, or where there is loss or damage to cargo. (Anderson, 2005) Naturally, the 
voluntary guide of TMSA would not have comparable legal impact on either 
operators or charterers. However, considering the legal impact of TMSA with regard 
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to the carrier’s liability and the charterer’s due diligence requirement; selected 
aspects of the TMSA legal implications are described here. 
 
With reference to TMSA and on the operator side, members of INTERTANKO have 
raised a concern that they might be taking on a higher liability when confirming to 
TMSA. The concern is based on the consideration that by submitting the TMSA 
score to the charterer they might be “relieving the charterer of some exposure in the 
event of an incident. 
 
Since marine accidents have created an inspection industry that is heavily controlled 
by oil majors in order to limit their liability (8), INTERTANKO produced a TMSA 
liability clause that members can include and point out to the charterer to eliminate 
any possibility that the submission of TMSA score might be interpreted as a notion 
of reliving the charterer from his duties by agreeing to release their TMSA data to 
him.  
 
The TMSA liability clause reads: “The information contained herein is provided to 
the best of owner’s/manager’s knowledge and in good faith, however, the accuracy 
of the information is not guaranteed either expressly or by implication and 
owners/managers exclude liability for any errors or omissions whether caused 
negligently or otherwise.”(INTERTANKO, 2005) 
 
According to Tan (2006), while it is difficult to attach liability to classification 
societies on their inspections, TMSA and the vetting process may face such a 
liability; TMSA and the vetting program are helpful in removing the market for 
substandard tankers. Such vetting programs (as complemented by TMSA) may 
themselves prove to be a source of liability for charterers. (Tan, 2006) 
 
In holding a charterer –defendant to a particular standard of care, courts of law may 
examine whether vetting have been properly conducted and recommendations 
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adhered to. A failure to meet such industry standards may thus be constructed as a 
lack of due diligence on the charterers part, therefore, Courts could (and should) 
impose liability on the charterer is a spill is resulted from the chartered vessel. Such a 
liability will have a positive impact on the charterer and the operator. (Tan, 2006) 
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4. Internal Auditing vs. Self Assessment 
 
Internal auditing of the ISM Code and the self-assessment of TMSA are two totally 
different exercises; yet, they are both an exercise where the main objective is to 
assess the level of compliance (or conformance) to the concerned safety management 
tool. The following discussion is aimed at exploring the different approach of both 
exercises and their potential benefit to the safety management of the company.  
 
The ISM Code in section 12 requires the company to carry out internal safety audits 
to verify whether safety and pollution-prevention activities comply with the safety 
management system. In addition 12.2 requires the company to periodically evaluate 
the efficiency of and, when needed, review the safety management system in 
accordance with procedures established by the Company. As well as requiring that 
audits and possible corrective actions be carried out in accordance with documented 
procedures.  
 
Kristiansen (2005) sets out the audit process as illustrated in figure 10 but then 
comments on the Guidelines on Implementation of ISM that it is fairly vague on how 
to verify that a safety management system (SMS) conforms with the Code. It (the 
guidelines) admits that certain criteria for assessment are necessary, but also warns 
against the emergence of prescriptive requirements and solutions prepared by 
external consultants.  
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Figure 10 The Audit process 
Source: Kristiansen, S. (2005), Maritime Transportation – Safety management and Risk 
Analysis, Elsevier, Amsterdam 
 
Nevertheless, Kristiansen (2005) comments that one potential problem in terms of 
auditing compliance with the ISM Code is that the Code itself and the SMS 
documents, which establish the basis for the audit, are fairly general and open to 
subjective evaluation. 
 
On the other hand, with regard to TMSA, INTERTANKO believes that the system of 
self-assessment can be relied upon to be successful and assist in the reduction of 
multiple inspections. This is an aim that every ship owner aspires for, the reason is 
that by reduced inspections time utilisation of the vessel can be maximized and 
consequently profit margins as well. 
 
In order to achieve that, the process must be transparent and there should be a 
uniform interpretation of the self-assessment results across oil majors. However, it is 
suggested that if every oil company uses different criteria for practically assessing 
the self assessment by examining data such as detention history, PSC findings and 
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incidents history, the efforts for transparency in the market will be hampered by 
confusion on the part of shipping operators. 
 
Nonetheless, since TMSA has build upon the ISM Code, Internal audit is part of 
element 12 of TMSA; this element requires the vessel operators to carry out internal 
audits to verify that both vessel and shore-based staff are consistently following the 
management system. Audits should be made of all vessels under fleet management 
and of all onshore support functions. (OCIMF, 2008) 
 
4.1. Present structures 
 
The industry saw that there is a need for more safeguards for vetting and chartering 
above the both ISM and SIRE. This need arises from the criticism of the 
requirements of the ISM code not being applied properly by tanker operators. 
(Turker & Er. 2008) The present structure of applying self-assessment and how 
charterers and operators use it will bring along a better understanding of the 
“practical” advantages of performing self assessment to both charterers and 
operators. 
 
The self assessment exercise is not relied upon exclusively in the chartering decision, 
this in fact encourages self assessment as when Oil Majors screen vessels for 
potential service, make an evaluation from their databases of lagging indicators, in 
order to confirm that the standard of performance matches the operator’s self 
assessment. (Allport, 2009) 
 
Nevertheless, The vetting process excludes a considerable number of tankers from 
being considered for business with oil majors. According to Dan (2006) of British 
Petroleum Group, the total world fleet is 12,500 tankers, out of which the oil majors 
are interested in about 5,000. Of these only about 3,500 ships are acceptable to the 
BP Group (Dan, 2006) 
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TMSA guidance places considerable emphasis on the value of self assessment with 
regard to the exercise being a “true” self assessment. Users will learn most and 
derive the most benefit when personnel directly involved in the activity carry out the 
self assessment exercise. 
 
Whilst initiatives such as TMSA can help with successful running of an SMS it was 
apparent that a good SMS was achievable with minimum financial investment 
provided there was the necessary commitment from senior management and all those 
involved in the implementation process. (Anderson, 2008a) 
 
However, it could be argued that the internal audit process is of immense importance 
due to the limitations that the external audit is subject to. This is because the depth at 
which some Administrations or their Recognised Organisations actually go into the 
SMS, in the very limited time allowed during the external audit is so shallow as to 
allow nothing more than the most cursory overview. (Anderson, 2007) 
 
4.2. Safety Culture  
 
Whenever the ISM Code has been the subject of a study, the organisational safety 
culture is discussed as well. That is because introducing “or enhancing” the 
organisational safety culture is at the core of the ISM Code. There are many 
definitions for a safety culture but the most uncomplicated definitions of the safety 
culture is” Safety culture reflects the attitudes, beliefs, perception and values that 
employees share in relation to safety”. (Lappalainen, 2008)  
 
However, reseloution A.913(22) states that the application of the ISM Code should 
support and encourge the development of a safety culture in shipping. Success 
factors for the development of a safety culture are, inter alia, comintment, values and 
beleifes. (IMO, 2002) 
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Nevertheless, in the context of the following discussion, safety and quality are two 
sides of one coin; Kristiansen (2005) supports this view, he commented that safety 
and quality could be seen as synonymous in shipping. 
 
Nevertheless, shipping companies operate in watertight compartments with authority 
concentrated at the top. Therefore commitment from the top management towards 
safety “Quality” requirements must be assured in order to gradually change this 
perception (AL-Hamran, 1999). Management commitment in the ISM Code is 
essential to its success that is realised if the SMS of the company reflects the 
requirements of the ISM Code in letter and spirit. The relationship and interaction 
between safety culture and safety management is illustrated in figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 Interactions between safety culture, safety management and operations  
Source: Lappalainen, J. (2008). Transforming maritime safety culture- Evaluation of the 
impacts of the ISM Code on maritime safety culture in Finland. Centre for maritime studies, 
University of Turku. 
 
The described interaction (taking safety and quality into consideration) is a product 
of what is called Total Quality Management system (TQM). As cited by Lappalainen  
(2008), TQM is a concept that was developed in the 1980s, developed by Joseph M. 
Juran and Deming in 1986. This concept is based upon the proposal that the 
company’s performance is based on an ideal organizational culture, which is a 
product of the commitment to produce quality and high productivity for the 
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organization productivity of the company. (Lappalainen, 2008)  
 
With regard to TMSA, safety culture is defined as a philosophy promoting safety as 
the ultimate consideration for all company personnel and applied to all activities 
undertaken, both ashore and at sea. (OCIMF, 2008), the emphasis in that definition 
was on safety as a philosophy. Additionally, the scope of this philosophy should 
include operations ashore and at sea, but it is hard to ignore that TMSA 
encompasses, in addition, customer quality requirements as well. In other words, the 
customers (based upon their expectations) originate the basis of this philosophy. 
 
It could be argued that the success of the customer’s expectations is based upon their 
actual knowledge of the ideals of that philosophy. Based upon the author’s 
experience, since many oil majors control their own fleet as well, it is a fact that 
many of them are not short of experience in formulating ideals of performance. 
Adding to that the previously described between customer and operator, this 
philosophy can only improve. 
 
Keeping the contribution of the ISM Code in mind, TMSA guidelines acknowledged 
the contribution of the ISM Code to the promotion of safety culture. The guidelines 
state that the management and operation of vessels within a culture of safety and 
environmental excellence was formalised with the introduction of the International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code. (OCIMF, 2008) 
 
The ISM Code requires vessel operators to implement a safety management system 
that will help them to achieve “ideally” incident-free operations. However, there is a 
clear distinction between the standards of those vessel operators that embrace the 
spirit of the ISM code and those that aim to fulfil only its minimum requirements. 
This variability may result in a charterer with due-diligence concerns having to 
assess the operational standards of individual vessel operators. (OCIMF, 2008) 
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Additionally a number of KPIs are dedicated towards promoting safety culture within 
the organisation. 
 
Although TMSA and ISO Standards are different, they are both implemented in 
many tanker operators’ companies. ISO and TMSA share the view that they are 
quality standards as opposed to minimum safety standards of the ISM Code. 
Therefore, although the primary purpose and objects of the ISM Code and the ISO 
standards are different, there are so many common features that there are good 
possibilities to merge the safety management systems, quality management systems 
and environmental management systems into one integrated management system in a 
shipping company. (Lappalainen, 2008) 
 
In addition, the difference between the TMSA and ISM Code show its self upon 
guidance where TMSA not only provides the objectives to be achieved but also gives 
detailed guidelines through key performance indicators to achieve them. These 
guidelines are not vague but quite certain, almost leaving any room for possibilities 
of circumventing them. (Turker & ER, 2008) 
 
As well, as cited by Mejia (2001), commenting on the ability to quantifibly measure 
the performance of safety management, Mitchison and Papadakis (1999) emphasize 
that while safety performance measurement is useful in describing the present state 
of a safety management system, it is even more useful as a basis for improving the 
system’s performance, i.e., by identifying weaknesses and targeting necessary 
interventions. 
 
The motivation that drives adoption of a safety culture is worth of consideration, 
although complying with legislation is a big part of the motivation behind complying 
with the requirements of the ISM Code. It is not the threat of punishment, which 
should drive the industry to achieving higher standards, but a genuine desire to work 
as a responsible industry. (Turker & ER, 2008) 
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4.3. Continuous improvement cycle 
 
Continues improvement is an essential part of confirming to TMSA, yet, it is evident 
that the concept of continues improvement was not an invention of TMSA, indeed, 
within section 9 of the ISM Code is a concept of continually improving the SMS of 
safety onboard by learning from accidents or events which nearly became accidents 
(Anderson, 2003). However, this continues improvement concept is reliant on 
“something” happening, either an actual accident or a near miss. Anderson (2005) 
illustrated continues improvement cycle of the ISM Code as shown in figure (12). 
 
Figure 12 A cycle of continual improvement 
Source: Anderson, P. (2005), Cracking the Code – The Relevance of the ISM Code and its 
impacts on shipping practices, The Nautical Institute, London. 
 
 
Compared with TMSA, the scheme of the continues improvement concept of the 
ISM Code is different from that of the TMSA, the ISM Code concept of continues 
improvement is based upon learning from past experiences. Additionally, the 
continues improvement is also a product of the actions required by the management 
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system. Namely the Plan, Do, Check and Act, Some times referred to as the PDCA 
cycle illustrated in figure (13). 
 
Figure 13 PDCA Cycle 
Source: Lappalainen, J. (2008). Transforming maritime safety culture- Evaluation of the 
impacts of the ISM Code on maritime safety culture in Finland. Centre for maritime studies, 
University of Turku. 
 
In addition, according to Kristiansen (2005), with reference to the TQM, the 
continues improvement cycle is a basis for the philosophy of quality in TQM, he 
organizational safety level can be managed through the use of a set of basic safety 
management activities. These activities may be modelled in a ‘safety management 
spiral’ illustrating safety management as an activity of continuous improvement. 
(Kristiansen, 2005), once more, the philosophy of ‘quality’ is a product of 
management action as illustrated in figure 14. 
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Figure 14 Safety management spiral 
Source: Kristiansen, S. (2005), Maritime Transportation – Safety management and Risk 
Analysis, Elsevier, Amsterdam 
 
On the other hand, the scheme of continues improvement concept in TMSA is based 
upon improving the achieved score. This continues improvement concept of TMSA 
could be considered as a third element of improvement, if the first two elements are 
the Systems audits and hazardous occurrences reporting and corrective actions 
elements of the SMS. However, that is not far from the ‘safety management spiral’ 
illustrated from TQM.  
 
TMSA comments on continues improvement by stating that leadership at all levels is 
an essential part of any improvement process. The building blocks of effective 
leadership are clarity in describing desired targets and strategic vision, direction, 
communication, trust, commitment and reinforcement. Leadership provides 
alignment to strategies, strong direction for staff and continuous improvement in 
individual and collective results. The continuous-improvement cycle aims to deliver 
improvements through a company’s management system. (OCIMF, 2008)  
 
The following text illustrates the scope of TMSA in continually improving the SMS, 
emitted from the first edition of the guidance; the 2004 guidance states that the 
quality-assessment process is central to the TMSA program. In figure15, it is 
illustrated that the outer circle combines the ISM code with the requirements of ship 
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operators and industry guidance. The inner circle represents the ship operator’s 
management system, indicating its compliance with the requirements of the ISM 
code, and a continuous-improvement cycle. (OCIMF, 2004)  
 
 
Figure 15 Continues improvement cycle of TMSA (2004) 
Source: Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) (2004) Tanker Management 
and Self Assessment (TMSA) Guide, London, UK. 
 
 
Evidently, element 12 of the guide is dedicated to continuous improvement, the aim 
is for vessel operators to establish KPIs to measure their quality management 
system’s effectiveness in meeting the organisational goals and regulatory 
responsibilities. (OCIMF, 2008) Even though stage 4 is the highest “score” for any 
given KPI within the guidance, stage 4 is not the ultimate objective because 
continual improvement is the very foundation of TMSA. (Turker & ER, 2008) 
 
Weather this difference in scheme or concept is of practical value is debatable, 
because since TMSA is based on the ISM Code, then the provisions of section 9 of 
the Code are incorporated in TMSA. In addition, internal auditing of SMS, or indeed 
the external audit, could be considered as an improvement mechanism for improving 
the SMS. 
 
Nevertheless, it is apparent (to the author) that there is a third paradigm to the 
continues improvement of TMSA, that is the improvement to the guidelines and its 
associated KPIs based on the experience of the industry with these guidelines, only a 
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positive and active dialogue between operators and charters (on an organisational and 
strong representation basis) will be capable of such an achievement. 
 
4.4. Future prospects 
 
Naturally, as previously discussed, one advantage of a voluntary guidance such as 
TMSA, is its ability to change without too many constraints in response to changes in 
the business best practice or as the experience of the operators from confirming to 
this guide expands. The dialogue between the operators and OCIMF as well as the 
benefits to the guidance itself and the industry resulting from that dialogue has been 
discussed earlier. 
 
Adding to that, TMSA has seen an important development in the form of the new 
edition being published; this is because this edition: 
• This edition demonstrated that there is an active dialogue between operators 
and charterers. 
•  Proved development of business best practice based on the industry 
experience. 
• Enlarged the scope of the guidelines application to include all tankers, 
including small costal vessels and barges. 
 
OCIMF deputy director Captain Mike Sitts went as far as to describe the original 
programming as “primitive” in comparison. (Fairplay 2008, July 17) Moreover, in 
order to provide a clear and specific picture of these enhancements, appendix (A) 
TMSA 2004/2008 Gap Analysis, prepared by INTERTANKO details the changes to 
TMSA in its second edition. Whether in the future, TMSA will continue to be 
updated both in scope and application will remain to be seen. 
 
Going back to when TMSA was first launched, it represented a challenge to some 
operators, then again, new challenges will continue to emerge. As an example, the 
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new wave entering the market are more environmentally friendly than existing 
tankers especially in line with the Energy Efficiency and Fuel Management 
guidelines published by OCIMF. The concern will be, if that will give new tankers 
an advantage over older ones, or charterers vetting procedures will accommodate 
such differences. Yet, challenges are also associated with opportunities. Success 
factors may include timing, creativity and technology developments. (Koren, 2009) 
 
Furthermore, it is reported that non-tanker operators are considering TMSA; they are 
increasingly buying into the best practice generated by TMSA. (Anderson, 2008b) 
OCIMF director Phil Davies stated that some members with mixed fleets are using 
TMSA as a general management tool for other ship types, based on that only the 
cargo-specific aspects of the assessment are unique to tanker operators. (Fairplay 
2008, July 17) as well, it appears that bulk carrier operators and owners are now 
beginning to use the scheme as a means of assessing their own safety management 
systems. (Anderson, 2008b) 
 
On a whole new level, Other initiatives such as the InterManager initiative, which is 
an attempt to publish a set of KPI’s common to all ships in a database, possibly 
owned by IMO. This database might be web based, ship-owner or manager will enter 
individual ship data, other data will be entered direct from other sources such as Port 
State Control findings, this will allow ship-owners to measure the improvement of 
their ship’s performance globally or against other in similar categories such as flag. 
At the end of the day ship-owners might eventually be forced to show their score 
cards in order to be fixed for cargo. 
 
Nevertheless, with reference to the three cultural eras prescribed in the ISF/ICS 
(1996) guidelines, it seems (to the author) that the industry is heading towards a new 
era, a period that will be dominated by performance evaluation and measurement, not 
just mere compliance with legislative regulations. Initiatives such as the TMSA 
could be the start signal of this era. 
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Part two 
 
5. Methodological procedure and Data collection 
5.1. Description 
 
As described in earlier chapters of this study, the impact and the industry’s attitude 
toward the ISM Code has been covered extensively in various types of studies. 
Comparably, TMSA has not been covered to the same degree of detail in studying its 
impact as well as the industry’s attitude to self-assessment based on business best 
practice. The basic aim of this chapter of the study and the questionnaire exercise 
contained within is to attempt an assessment of the industries attitude towards a 
safety management tool that is based on business (TMSA). 
 
At the very beginning of this task the main difficulties facing this research were two 
fold, firstly, the incomparable availability of written work on ISM Code and TMSA. 
While the ISM Code naturally received much greater attention and in-depth analysis 
the TMSA on the other hand did not receive comparable analysis or research efforts. 
 
Secondly, the availability of data for this research, TMSA is a sensitive issue 
(commercially). Subsequently, (based on the author’s personnel experience- in 
particular while carrying out this exercise) many will consider it against their 
commercial interest to pass judgment on, or criticise any, aspects of the guidance. In 
addition, submitted self-assessment data to OCIMF is confidential together with any 
detailed criteria used by specific oil majors on their selection process. 
 
Any attempt to assess TMSA in the same manner as several parties, as touched upon 
previously, assessed the ISM Code will prove to be extremely. Mejia (2001) 
commented on his approach to assess the ISM performance by stating that the non-
prescriptive nature of that Code ensures that each SMS is tailor-fitted to the 
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particular shipping company.  On the other, it presents a challenge for assessment 
and evaluation. (Mejia, 2001). 
 
Despite the fact that the pervious argument might also be applicable to TMSA, the 
author is of the opinion that approaching TMSA in the same manner will prove to be 
even more difficult due to a number of reasons. Few issues that come straight to 
mind and are worthy of being considered are: 
 
1- TMSA is a management tool that shares many “difficult to measure” objectives 
as the ISM Code; TMSA might even be proven to be even more difficult to 
measure since it has built upon the ISM Code and it is difficult to separate the 
effects of the Code from those of TMSA. 
2- TMSA mainly applies to a sector of the tanker industry, though data collection 
might seem a trouble-free exercise, it is in the opinion of the author that such an 
exercise will be proven to be difficult. Due to the confidentiality and commercial 
sensitivity nature of TMSA data. 
3- If an approach is taken to study the effectiveness or the impact of TMSA on a 
scale similar to previously mentioned studies conducted on the ISM Code then 
that would require considerable resources. 
4- Findings or conclusions resulting from such a study would very likely share the 
same limitations with the findings of ISM Code studies. 
 
However, this study has the clear advantage of use of the available in-depth studies 
on a somewhat similar issue (impact of the ISM Code on the shipping industry). 
Additionally, the reference to the ISM Code has formed a basis for a better 
understanding of any conclusions obtained. 
 
Realizing that this study is limited by many factors both in the methodology and 
scope, it is of importance to summarise the main limiting factors of this study as 
follows: 
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1- Although there was a use of objective data in earlier chapters (ITERTANKO 
benchmarking database), this study is largely based on professionals’ subjective 
opinions. 
 
2- This study is not a comprehensive as has been explained earlier and will be 
further explored in this chapter, only selected issues were analysed and discussed 
in this study. 
 
3- Even if this paper is attempting to comparatively assess two different 
management tools, the descriptive parts together with a fair share of the data 
analysis is (naturally) not considering the ISM Code and TMSA on the same 
level. 
 
4- Analysis to data collected throughout the questionnaire exercise has been only 
descriptively in this paper. Even though established statistical methods have been 
applied to some key results; other specific limitations to suggested conclusions or 
observations are stipulated where appropriate.  
 
Some other data sources were used as well in this paper, such as benchmarking data 
from INTERTANKO, survey results from social networks and facts and figures from 
companies or organisations experience with TMSA in particular. 
 
5.2. Data Collection 
 
The purpose of this section of the study is to flag up some issues of limitation as well 
as some findings that have resulted from the questionnaire exercise. All figures and 
tables reported in this section have been generated as a result of the questionnaire 
exercise. 
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5.2.1. Questionnaire design: 
 
The questionnaire started with an introduction on the subject of the survey followed 
by few words assuring the respondents of the confidentiality of their contribution and 
the anonymity that will be strictly maintained. Additionally, respondents were 
assured that the aim of the questionnaire and any subsequent use of responses would 
be strictly for academic purposes. The emphasis on the anonymity of the responses 
and the purpose, use of data was driven by the sensitivity of the issue as described in 
earlier chapters of this study. 
 
The total number of questions (which was indicated at the start of the questionnaire) 
was 22 questions. The first two questions, relating to Gender and age of the 
respondents, were utilized at the start of the questionnaire as leading questions only. 
These two questions (results are produced in figures 16 and 17) were aimed at 
gathering information on the profile of respondents. They were not used in any data 
analysis in terms of grouping or cross-referencing results. 
 
Figure 16 Gender distribution 
 
 
Figure 17 Age distribution 
 
In order to encourage responding to the questionnaire, it was electronic based and 
designed so that there was no need for respondents to input any text to answer the 
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questions. Other than if respondents choose to add comments to question 22, answers 
of questions 1-7 involved a selection from a dropdown menu and questions 8-22 
involved selection by single computer mouse click. 
 
Furthermore, questions 3 to 7 were aimed at finding out more detailed profile of 
respondents, these questions were relative to the area of this study. The collected data 
was used in grouping, correlation, cross tabulation and other descriptive statistics 
used in this study. Detailed analysis of the profile of respondents is provided in 
appendix (B). 
  
The following list provides justification behind the inclusion of some leading 
questions (questions 3 to 7) as well as a brief description of the use of there 
responses in the data analysis: 
 
• Question 3 was included to find out the current professional background of the 
respondent. Even though 10 options where given as a response, the analysis of 
these responses were grouped as two groups, “shipping company” background 
and “non-shipping company” background. Having as much as 10 options 
provided a clearer picture of the profile of respondents while grouping them into 
two groups allowed a comparison between the “audience” of TMSA and the ISM 
as well as those who have an active part in the marine industry but not directly 
involved in the daily “commercial” management of ships. 
 
• Question 4 was included to attain the level of seagoing experience of 
respondents; therefore, in the analysis it was scaled from 1 to 5 according to the 
level of seagoing experience of the respondent. Although that was again a 
positive addition to the profile of respondents, further analysis of response to this 
question, mainly by comparing and grouping responses, did not yield any 
constructive results or observations to be reported in this study. 
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• Question 5 was included to find out if responders were involved in the shore-
based management of ships and if that included management of tankers or not. 
The reason behind including that question is to find out how would the answers 
of companies involved with the confirmation to TMMSA and varies from that of 
others. 
 
• In the same manner, question 6 was a scale from 1 to 5 indicating the level of 
experience with the ISM Code, the analysis of this question grouped responses in 
4 groups as follows: 
o 1st group simply have no management capacity over ISM. 
o 2nd group had a management capacity over ISM Implementation during 
the last 3 years. (Those respondents were involved with ISM 
implementation when TMSA fully introduced) 
o 3rd group had a management capacity over ISM Implementation during 
the last 3 to 6 years. (Those respondents had a management capacity over 
ISM implementation and most likely have experienced the introduction of 
TMSA as well.) 
o 4th group had a management capacity over ISM Implementation during 
the last 6 to 10 years. (Those respondents had management capacity over 
ISM implementation for a number of years predating the introduction of 
TMSA.) 
 
Note: The motive behind choosing this time frame was based on the date of 
introducing TMSA to the industry. 
 
• Question 7 was a 4-point scale to find out the level of involvement with TMSA 
guidelines since that the industry experience with TMSA does not exceed 5 
years. 
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The corner stones of the questionnaire were Questions 8 and 9; they were introduced 
to measure the over all attitudes of respondents towards the two management tools. 
Mainly these two questions were used as variables for correlations and cross 
tabulation for different groups of respondents grouped according to answers for 
previous questions as described earlier. 
 
The scale of question 8 referring to respondents’ opinion on the positive impact of 
ISM on the shipping industry, the 5-point scale were very effective, effective, 
neutral, ineffective and very ineffective. On the other hand, gauging the respondents 
attitude to TMSA in question 9 was on 3-point scale (excluding respondents with no 
opinion on TMSA), the motives behind this arrangement are: 
 
1- To compare the results with data obtained from a public social network on 
the same question. 
2- Respondents will continue to offer their opinion on specific areas of TMSA 
at the following questions. 
 
Figure 18 illustrates the time frame this paper is involved in with reference to the 
introduction of the two management tools: 
 
Figure 18 Examined time-span of study 
 
Furthermore, questions 10 to 21 were 5-point “Likert scale” questions with the 
following range: 
1- Strongly agree     2- Agree     3- Neutral     4- Disagree     5- Strongly disagree 
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This arrangement has enabled further analysis of the responses as will be detailed 
later in this study. However, the author is assuming that respondents choosing the 
option neutral to many of the statements in the questionnaire are choosing not to take 
a position on the statement, this is a major assumption in this exercise.  
 
5.2.2. Questionnaire distribution. 
 
A large number of invitations to participate in the survey were sent to individual e-
mail addresses. It was difficult to keep track of the total number of invitations but the 
direct invitations sent by the author were 1643 e-mail invitations, the following 
means were adapted to distribute the questionnaire: 
 
• The majority of invitations were sent via an automatic generated invitation 
from the server where the author using an e-mail list from e mails gathered 
from shipping directories and published e-mail addresses of various 
organizations, such as, maritime and flag state administrations, classification 
societies, inter governmental organizations and Non-governmental 
Organizations.  
 
• Personal e mail invitations sent to individuals 20% of whom identified with 
the Author but the rest did not as there e-mails where obtained from 
published presentation on TMSA, conferences proceedings or web based 
social networks of professionals such as http://network.tankeroperator.com/ 
and http://network.thedigitalship.com/. 
 
• Some participants as well forwarded invitations but there is no track as to 
their number. 
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However, the number of invitations accepted is as follows: 
• Number of invitations accepted through the survey server  283 
• Number of invitations accepted through personnel contact  103 
• Total number of invitations accepted    386 
5.3. General comments on responses to questioner 
 
The date filtering was conducted in several stages; the first stage was the rejection of 
some entries due to a number of reasons as per table 2: 
 
Table 2 Initial data filtering  
(Ignored Data entries) 
Justification Count 
Failure to provide an answer to any of the question 2 
Single answer provided 6 
Answers provided to leading questions only (questions1 to 7) 13 
Total 21 
Total number of data entries accepted 365 
 
In order to have a better presentation of the questions, it was decided to spread the 
questions over two WebPages but a total 89 out of 369 respondents have failed to 
move to the second page of the questionnaire to complete it. The following 
tabulation is an attempt to analyze the cause behind losing 89 valuable responses, 
which represents 24% of the total number of responses received. 
 
The nest table demonstrates one of many attempts to categories the respondents 
whom did not proceed to the next page of the questionnaire, the table does not show 
any significant findings. Even respondents answering (no opinion on TMSA) 
proceeded to offer valuable answers to the rest of the questionnaire; the author fails 
to offer an explanation to that oversight. 
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Table 3 Count of respondents whom failed to proceed to the 2
nd
 page.  
(Out of the total number of respondents within same group) 
Groups of responses failing to proceed to 2
nd
 page Count Total  Percentage 
No opinion on TMSA (Q9) 28 82 34% 
No answer to Q9 5 9 55% 
No answer to Q8 6 9 66% 
No answer to Q7 3 9 33% 
Involved with TMSA at some level (Q7) 32 164 19% 
No management capacity over ISM (Q6) 36 133 29% 
Not involved in shore management of ships (Q5) 36 131 27% 
No seafaring experience (Q4) 40 113 35% 
 
It might be possible that question 9 which was the last question on page one was in 
fact the first question on TMSA at the same time, this might have suggested to 
respondents who did not notice the page number or the number of questions that this 
was the last question. On the other hand, only 12% of respondents have answered all 
22 questions but 95% of respondents have answered 21 questions, i.e. more than 
95% of the questionnaire. 
 
The author has attempted to contact some responders with very interesting comments 
offered in question 22 of the questionnaire in an attempted to further explore their 
views and opinions but have failed to grant their permission to be quoted on their 
opinions or experience. 
 
Some questions had only few and basic answers available to respondents, which may 
not have offered a good range of options for the responder to choose from. 
Respondents’ answers may have been better placed somewhere between the options 
provided to them, e.g. question asked if the respondent believed that TMSA had a 
positive impact on the tanker industry, the available options were: 
1- Yes definitely    2- Possibly   
 3- A lot of trouble with no real benefit 4- No opinion on TMSA 
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The respondent’s might have wished to express his disagreement with the positive 
impact of TMSA but not as strongly as stating that it was a lot of trouble for no real 
benefit. 
 
The data has been analysed statistically in a descriptive manner only, the following is 
the descriptive statistics used in this paper, graphic representation of data is used for 
most statistics. Only strongest correlation values observed are reported in this section 
of the study. 
5.4. Examination of results 
 
During this Examination, the text in blue colour will indicate respondents comment 
while the green coloured text will be used for questions of the questionnaire. 
 
5.4.1. Respondents’ view on the value of the comparative 
assessment 
 
At the start of this endeavour, it was apparent that some sort of explanation as to the 
nature of the comparative assessment nature of this study was necessary; this was 
fully explored at earlier chapters of this study.  Nevertheless, it was felt important to 
assess if respondents share this view or not, in other words, based on the respondents 
own “knowledge” experience with the ISM code and TMSA, was it “fundamentally” 
feasible to attempt a comparative assessment of two totally different management 
tools? 
 
The earlier responses to that question were encouraging; the early responses 
supported the feasibility of such study. Nevertheless, It is clear from some comments 
received during the questionnaire exercise that some respondents opposed this view; 
some respondents (10%) have refused the suggestion that these management tools 
are comparable on the two level addressed, i.e. approach and effect. The following 
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comment from a respondent maintain the latter view, the respondent commented that 
“ISM and TMSA are not directly comparable as ISM is mandatory while TMSA is in 
theory not”. 
 
From the previous comment and some others received, it was clear that the main 
objection on the nature of this study was based on the fact that the ISM Code is 
mandatory instrument while TMSA is a voluntary tool. While that is true it, the 
objection was on “direct comparison” between the two and a total of 58 % of 
respondents are in favour of the nature of this study. A comment from a respondent 
in favour of this approach stated that “Best industry practices of TMSA tie in nicely 
with continuous improvement concept of ISM. It is not the ISM Code or TMSA that 
needs improvement as much as the tanker operator's commitment to its spirit and the 
commercial benefits that accrue from such commitment” 
 
The previously reported figures are based on the respondents’ agreement with the 
following statement “TMSA is a voluntary safety management tool that can be 
compared in its approach or in its effect on tanker industry to the implementation of 
ISM”, it is observed that 52% of respondents agree to the statement while 
6%strongly agree as per figure 19.  
 
Figure 19 Total responses to (Q 17) 
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Figure 20 Grouped response to Q 17 (1
st
 attempt) 
 
In the above analysis, the results described are for all responses to the question. In an 
attempt to further analyse if that statement will be stronger supported by any group 
of respondents, the support to the previous statement was cross tabulated and 
graphically represented with responses from questions 9 and 8 describing the rating 
of the positive impact of the ISM Code and TMSA on the shipping industry 
respectively, the following results where observed: 
 
Taking a sample of 267 respondents whom have answered both questions it is 
observed that there is a weak positive linear correlation between responses to 
both questions (correlation value of +0.17), i.e. it is likely that support to the 
notion that ISM Code and TMSA both had a comparable impact or effect on 
the tanker industry. Figure 21 represents graphically the cross-referencing. 
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Figure 21 Grouped response to Q 17 (2
nd
 attempt) 
 
In another attempt, taking a sample of 216 responses offering an answer to both this 
statement and a rating of the positive impact of TMSA it was observed that a 
somewhat stronger linear correlation value of +0.24 exist (still in the weak category). 
In other words, comparing the previous two observations, the majority of agreement 
to this statement comes from a comparable two majorities, (30%) of respondents 
with an answer of “effective” to the positive impact of the ISM code and (33%) from 
respondent with an answer of “yes, definitely” when asked on the positive impact of 
TMSA on the tanker industry. 
 
Furthermore, analysing the level of support to the previous statement from 3 different 
groups involved in the shore based management of ships categorised by involvement 
in the management of tankers is as represented in figure 22. 
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Figure 22 Grouped response to Q 17 (3
rd
 attempt) 
 
Noticeably, the majority of support to the previous statement is attributed to 
respondents involved in the shore management of tankers only. Additionally, no 
linear correlation was found between the time spent in a management capacity over 
ISM Code and result of rating to the previous statement. Similarly, no correlation 
was found between support of the previous statement and organisational background, 
seafaring experience level or experience level in a management capacity over ISM 
implementation of respondents. 
 
Admittedly, a strong weakness in the previous analysis is in the statement itself, the 
statement stipulates that the ISM Code and TMSA are comparable in impact or 
approach but it does not specify in which one of these regards. As reported by some 
respondents, this statement was subject to interpretation to a large degree in addition 
to the inclusion of two options in the statement (approach or impact), which implies 
that agreement – or disagreement - to the statement could be referenced to approach, 
impact or both, this oversight fortunately was not repeated in other statements in the 
questionnaire. 
 
 Nevertheless, it is worth reporting that the strongest support to the comparative 
assessment nature of this study comes from respondents whom are involved in the 
management of tankers, this could be attributed to the level of practical experience 
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with TMSA. Indeed, mere theoretical awareness of TMSA and practical experience 
with TMSA are two deferent levels of knowledge, that could explain the support of 
the comparative assessment nature of this study that comes from respondents whom 
are involved in the management of tankers, i.e. assumingly, respondents whom have 
had practical experience with TMSA. 
 
5.4.2. Positive impact of safety management tools 
 
It is necessary at this stage to explore the overall attitude of respondents towards the 
ISM Code and TMSA. Starting with the ISM Code, the general response to the 
positive impact of the ISM Code was obtained by asking respondents “How effective 
would you rate the positive impact of the ISM code on the Shipping industry?” The 
general results based on a total response from 350 respondents were as per figure23. 
 
Figure 23 Total response to (Q 8) 
 
With regard to the positive impact of TMSA on the tanker industry, respondents 
were asked the following question: “Do you believe TMSA had a positive impact on 
the tanker industry? “The general results based on a total response from 350 
respondents were as per figure 24. 
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Figure 24 Total response to (Q 9) 
 
As there are many interpretations as to what constitutes a strong support, or for that 
matter a strong disagreement, the author’s attempts to cross reference general 
response to questions 8 and question 9 with respondents’ agreement (or 
disagreement) with provided statements in the questionnaire are produced in 
appendix (C).  
 
5.4.3. Application of TMSA principles to non-tankers 
 
Within the context of this survey it was considered appropriate to try to establish 
whether respondents are of the opinion that the principles of TMSA are applicable or 
expandable to include other industries, i.e. industries other than the tanker industry. 
Therefore, respondents were asked to rate their support to the following statement: 
“other industries could benefit from the implementation of a safety management tool 
such as TMSA for non-tankers”. The total response of 217 respondents to that 
statement is illustrated in figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25 Total response to (Q 13) 
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It was observed that a total of 62% of respondents either agree or strongly agree with 
that statement. However, as illustrated in figure 26, the majority of the support to that 
statement is a attributed  to respondents involved in the management of both tankers 
and other types of vessels. This category of respondents is probably the most suitable 
category of respondents to comment on such a statement. That is because this group 
of respondents are most likely involved with the voluntary confirmation to TMSA as 
well as mandatory compliance with the ISM, both on tankers and other types of 
vessels. 
 
Figure 26 Grouped response to (Q 13) 
 
5.4.4. Implementation of safety management tools in an new 
company 
 
Clearly the introduction of a safety management tool to a new company rather than 
to an established one is going to have a bearing on its aptitude to comply or confirm 
to this management tool. Based on comments documents in TMSA conference 
proceedings, especially those held at the early days when TMSA was first 
introduced, it was considered appropriate to test the respondents’ view on whether 
TMSA in its present form, keeping in mind the amendments introduces in the second 
edition, would stand the test of being  
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Analysing the data collected from responses to the following statement “TMSA is 
easier to implement on a new company rather than on an established company”; the 
general response from 269 respondents was observed as per figure 27. 
 
Figure 27 Total response to (Q 9) 
 
Nevertheless, in an attempt to further investigate these responses, data was grouped 
according to responses to questions 5, 6, 8 and 9, no correlation was found during 
that analysis and no observation is to be reported. However, it was observed that the 
majority of disagreement with the previous statement is attributed to respondents 
whom have indicated that they had a management capacity over the ISM Code for 
the last 6 to 10 years, i.e. respondents whom have been involved in the management 
of the ISM Code in their organisations prior to the introduction of TMSA and after 
that introduction as well. 
 
On the other hand, considering the other two groups as per figure 28, the level of 
agreement with the previous statement is not substantial but they are only slightly on 
the agreement side. The most probable explanation for such an observation is that 
respondents from the first group are more experienced with the safety management 
in their organisations, they have witnessed the introduction of TMSA while they 
when there involvement with the management of the ISM Code in their organisation 
was established, therefore, it is at least apparent that in their view, implementing 
TMSA on a new company or an established one is  
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Figure 28 Grouped response to (Q 17) 
 
An apparent weakness in the reported observation is that it is not conclusive whether 
respondents whom did not support the previous statement are of the view that the 
absolute opposite is true, i.e. whether they are of the view that TMSA is harder to 
implement on a new company rather than to an established one. Although that is 
unlikely, analysis of the previous statement does not provide any conclusive 
evidence to that effect. 
5.4.5. Direct general comparison 
 
This section of the examination of results offers a descriptive analysis of selected 
aspects that were directly compared between the ISM Code and TMSA. 
Respondents’ attitude towards these selected issues is presented in this section.  
 
5.4.5.1. Businesses best practice 
 
The first selected aspect of this direct comparison between the two management tools 
was a test of the respondents’ opinion on the simplicity of the practical application   
the basis of these tools in general terms. In other words, since the ISM Code is 
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fundamentally generic regulations applicable to all, while TMSA is a more specific 
tool based on businesses best practice, which one of them (in the opinion of 
respondents) is easier to follow?  
 
For that reason, respondents were asked to rate their support to the following 
statement “Implementing clear guidance based on businesses best practice is easier 
to follow than generic regulations”. A good majority of 78% out of a total of 257 
respondents were in agreement with that statement as demonstrate in figure 29. 
 
Figure 29 Total response to (Q 14) 
 
Interestingly, after further analysis, there was a close agreement between three 
groups of respondents (as per figure 30); the first group is respondents whom have 
indicated that they have a management capacity over the ISM Code for the last 3 
years, the second group indicated that they had a management capacity for the last 3 
to 6 years while the third group indicated that they had a management capacity over 
the ISM Code in their organisation for the last 6 to 10 years.  
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Figure 30 Grouped response to (Q 14) 
 
Nevertheless, it is of some limitation that the wording of the previous statement was 
of a very general nature. It was anticipated that analysis of response to such a general 
statement would provide a picture of the overall assessment of the ease of practical 
compliance with the two management tools. However, the response to the previous 
statement does not provide any reasoning behind either agreement or disagreement. 
On the other hand, respondents’ level of support to other statements in the 
questionnaire would provide an insight into the motivation behind the level of 
support to the previous statement. 
 
5.4.5.2. Structure of the management tool 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters of this study, the structure of TMSA is a major 
aspect of its approach to safety management, whither the approach of TMSA is 
actually more structured than the ISM Code is the aspect that will be tested in this 
part of the study. Therefore, respondents to the questionnaire were asked to rate their 
agreement to the following statement “The approach of the TMSA is more structured 
and methodical than the ISM Code”, general response of 376 responses to the 
question indicates that 52% of responses agree while a considerable 42% responded 
neutral to the this statement as per figure 31. 
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Figure 31 Total response to (Q 10) 
 
In further analysing the response to that question, it was surprisingly observed that as 
per figure 32, respondents whom indicated that in their view the ISM Code was 
effective in its positive impact on the shipping industry have largely agreed with the 
statement. Respondents whom responded that TMSA had a positive impact on the 
tanker industry also mirrored this result. 
 
Figure 32 Grouped response to Q 10 (1
st
 attempt) 
 
Therefore, even if the general response to that statement indicated that there is a 
substantial percentage of respondents whom did not wish to take a position on that 
statement, further analysis indicates that the degree of agreement with the previous 
statement increases among respondents whom are in the view that both the ISM 
Code and TMSA had a positive impact on the shipping industry (or tanker industry 
in the case of TMSA). This result is illustrated in figure 33. 
 83  
 
Figure 33 Grouped response to Q 10 (2
nd
 attempt) 
5.4.5.3. Self assessment 
 
Another broad and general statement that was introduced in the questionnaire was 
asking respondents to rate their support of whether an Internal audit of SMS is better 
than self-assessment in TMSA. It was considered that those two totally different 
exercises are in-house corner stones of continues improvement aspects of the 
implementation of the ISM Code and TMSA. The aim of the generality of that 
statement is to obtain an over all picture of the respondents attitude towards the 
internal audit exercise as compared to the self-assessment exercise of TMSA.  
 
However, it was observed that the general response of 272 respondents to that 
statement was lower than the number of general responses to other statements in the 
questionnaire. In addition, analysis to the general response to that statement appears 
to suggest that the majority of respondents were reluctant to take a position on that 
statement as per figure 34.  
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Figure 34 Total response to (Q 20) 
 
Further analysis of that response by exploring the results of responses according to 
whether their managed fleet includes tankers or not or according to their degree of 
experience with the ISM Code, the picture does not change in any significant way as 
per figures 35 and 36. 
 
Figure 35 Grouped response to Q 20 (1
st
 attempt) 
 
Figure 36 Grouped response to Q 20 (2
nd
 attempt) 
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Although many attempts were undertaken to explore these results in many other 
ways, such as, grouping response according to their sea going experience or 
organisational background, the author was not able to reach any significant results, 
nor was he able to attain any grounds on why the majority of respondents were 
reluctant to take a position on that statement. 
 
However, a possible explanation would be that even if the majority of respondents 
supported the approach of this questionnaire, i.e. its comparative assessment 
approach between two totally different management tools, it is of some difficulty to 
comparatively asses practical exercises required by them in general terms. 
 
5.4.5.4. Impact on good operators 
 
As reported in earlier chapters, oil majors were one of the first organisations to push 
forward for the industry to comply with the ISM Code, nevertheless, since it was also 
reported that the ISM Code had a good impact on good operators, it was considered 
appropriate to attain of the same applies to TMSA. That is because even if the TMSA 
is theoretically voluntary, it is very difficult for tanker operators to be considered for 
charter by oil majors if they did not confirm to TMSA. 
 
Therefore, following on from what has just been explained, respondents were asked 
to rate their agreement with the following statement: “ISM had a good impact on 
good operators; the same applies to TMSA”. The general response from 270 
respondents to that statement indicated that a majority of 72% of respondents were in 
agreement with that statement as per figure 37. 
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Figure 37 Total response to (Q 16) 
 
Considering this result, it appears that almost two thirds of respondents were in 
agreement with the previous statement. This observed result is a strong vote of 
confidence for the suggestion that although the ISM Code and TMSA are 
fundamentally different, the positive attitude of good operators does not differentiate 
between minimum legislative requirements or voluntary management systems. The 
quality management of those operators will make a positive use of such instruments. 
 
5.4.5.5. Level of details in safety management tools 
 
An apparent major deference between the ISM Code and TMSA is the level of detail 
in each one of these management tools. Therefore, it was considered appropriate to 
examine the respondents’ evaluation of such a difference in the level of details as 
well as the merits of incorporate a higher level of details in safety management tools. 
 
This assessment was preformed on three levels, the first level was in reference to the 
guidance published by IMO on compliance and implementation of the ISM Code. 
Although these guidelines are not legally binding, they were introduced to encourage 
a uniform interpretation of the code (as discussed previously) and therefore, naturally 
encompass a larger degree of detail than the code itself. 
 
For that reason, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the following 
statement: “The level of detail in TMSA can be matched with Guidance published by 
the IMO on compliance and implementation of the ISM Code”. It was observed that 
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the general response from 270 respondents indicated that 49% of respondents are in 
agreement with that statement as per figure 38. 
 
Figure 38 Total response to (Q 19) 
 
However, it was also observed that 39% of respondents did not take a position on the 
prevouis statement. This considerable percentage could be attriubted the different 
nature of the details contained in the IMO guidance to ISM implementation and 
TMSA. Again, after further analysis, it was obsereved that the majority of support to 
that statement is atributed to respondents involved in the management of tankers and 
other types of ships as well as per figure 39. Nevertheless, this group of respondents 
also represent the strongest disagreement compared to the other two groups, therfore, 
this result is not significanlty different from the general response recived for that 
statement. 
 
Figure 39 Grouped response to (Q 19) 
 
The second investigated level of this analysis was concerned with the merits of the 
inclusion of a higher level of detail in management tools. Since the compliance with 
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the spirit of the regulation rather than turning them into a paper exercise is the very 
essence of success of the management tool (as discussed earlier) it was considered 
necessary to examine the respondents view on whether an increased level of detail 
(or decreased level of ambiguity) will increase the chances of compliance with the 
spirit of the management tool. 
 
Therefore, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the following 
statement “Increased level of detail in regulations concerning safety management 
increases the chances of compliance with the spirit of the regulations”. The general 
response from 267 respondents indicated that the level of agreement with that 
statement is somewhat stronger that the level of agreement with the test on the first 
level as per figure 40. 
 
Figure 40 Total response to (Q 21) 
 
 However, it was observed that the general response to that statement had a 
considerably less percentage of respondents in the “Neutral” category as per figure 
21. Additionally, further analysis revealed that the group that contributed the most to 
the support of that statement is the group of respondents involved in the management 
of tankers only. Evidently, the majority of respondents involved in management of 
tankers only are in favour of greater level of details in management tools.  
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Figure 41 Grouped response to (Q 21) 
 
Nonetheless, the previously reported observation should be considered together with 
the results observed with the test of the third level, which asked respondents to rate 
their agreement with the following statement “The TMSA is a management tool that 
is subject to interpretation by vetting inspectors as much as the ISM code is subject 
to interpretation, by Auditors”. Although, as per figure 42, the general response from 
269 respondents to the statement indicates that 57% of responses either agree or 
strongly agree, the agreement is almost equally shared between all three groups of 
respondents as per figure 43. It is feasible to comment that the general majority, no 
matter if they were involved in the management of takers or not, were of the opinion 
that the real benefit of a greater level of detail in safety management tools is to 
improve in their own performance rather than improve the outcome of external 
vetting or audits. 
 
 
Figure 42 Total response to (Q 18) 
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Figure 43 Grouped response to (Q 18) 
 
5.5. The ISM Code and TMSA coexistence 
Since the questionnaire considered two management tools where one of the (TMSA) 
was considered as an aid to compliance with the other (the ISM Code), and also since 
this questionnaire indicated the level of experience of respondents with the ISM 
Code, it was considered appropriate to explore if respondents were of the opinion 
that TMSA did actually serve as an aid to compliance with the ISM Code. 
 
Therefore, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the following simple, 
yet direct statement: “Confirming to TMSA is an aid to compliance with ISM”. The 
general response from 241 respondents indicated that 67% of respondents agree with 
that statement as per figure 44. 
 
Figure 44 Total response to (Q 15) 
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However, the highest level of agreement with that statement is attributed to 
respondents whom indicated that they were involved in the management of the ISM 
Code for the last 6-10 years as per figure 45. Since this group of respondents is the 
one that had the longest experience with the ISM Code including some years prior to 
the introduction of TMSA, it is to some degree valuable to report that TMSA was an 
aid to compliance with the ISM Code, particularly to respondents involved in that 
compliance prior to the introduction of the ISM Code. 
 
 
Figure 45 Grouped response to (Q 15) 
 
5.6. The way forward 
 
During the questionnaire exercise respondents were asked if they agree with the 
following statement “TMSA is the way forward for the shipping industry to move 
beyond minimum compliance attitude in relation to safety management and 
environment protection”. General response to the question indicates that 68% of 
responses either agree or strongly agree with that statement as per figure 46. 
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Figure 46 Total response to (Q 11) 
 
However, by exploring the relation ship between the support of that statement and 
the level of believe in the effectiveness of the ISM Code and TMSA respectively, the 
following observations were made: 
 
Figure 47 Grouped response to Q 11 (1
st
 attempt) 
As per figure 47, the agreement of respondents with the statement is proportioned to 
their rating of the positive impact of the ISM Code on the shipping industry by a 
positive correlation value of +0.32. Furthermore, the agreement of respondents with 
the statement is proportioned to their rating of the positive impact of the TMSA on 
the tanker industry by a stronger correlation value of +0.42. 
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Figure 48 Grouped response to Q 11 (2
nd
 attempt) 
 
It was observed that respondents supporting that TMSA had a positive impact on the 
shipping industry support the concept that it is the way forward for the shipping 
industry to move beyond minimum compliance more than respondents agreeing with 
the positive impact of the ISM Code. 
 
5.7. Practical suggestions for improvement of safety management 
 
As a result of the literature review conducted for this study, the author was tempted 
to examine the respondents view on selected issue that are closely related to the 
practicality of this study as well as practical propositions for future improvements of 
the impact of safety management tools on the shipping industry as a whole. 
 
Therefore, respondents were asked to in the last question of the questionnaire the 
following question: “how could we improve on the ISM Code in terms of compliance 
with lessons learned from reaction of the tanker industry to TMSA”. Response to this 
question was a choice of four options; respondents were able to chose make more 
than one choice, hence, the large number of responses received for this question (314 
total response). Additionally, option four was an invitation to comment on the issue. 
Respondents accepted that indentation to comment in option four but have largely 
commented on the subject of the whole study rather than on the issue of indicated in 
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this individual question. 21% of respondents offered valuable comments in option 
four. 
 
Nevertheless, option one was a statement that read “We cannot improve on ISM 
implementation with lessons learned from the TMSA, as TMSA has been appropriate 
to the tanker industry only”. This statement is concerned with the respondent opinion 
on any limitation of his views or experience with TMSA, since TMSA has been 
appropriate to the tanker industry alone. 
 
The observed result indicated in figure 49 demonstrates that only a minority of 
respondents (8%) have attached such a limitation to their views and experience of 
TMSA, i.e. the majority of respondents are of the view that even though TMSA has 
been appropriate to the tanker industry, their views (especially those expressed in the 
questionnaire exercise) can be generalised to include other industries.  
  
The second statement provided in the question was concerned with the IMO 
guidelines on ISM implementation, although these guidelines have been addressed in 
earlier questions in the questionnaire, it was considered necessary to examine the 
respondents view on whether these “Guidelines for the implementation of ISM code 
issued by the IMO could benefit from the TMSA systematic approach”. The observed 
result indicated that the majority of respondents (44%) are of the opinion that 
business best practice is an approach of some merit to be adopted for guidelines to 
the implementation of legislative tools. 
 
The third statement provided in the question was closely related to the second one, 
the second statement tests respondents’ views on the adoption of guidelines to the 
implementation to the ISM Code in an approach similar to the business best practice 
guidelines (measured by KPIs) of TMSA even if these guidelines should be 
applicable to the whole shipping industry. Therefore, respondents to the following 
statement: “ISM code applies to all shipping companies so the level of detail in 
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TMSA cannot be adopted in the guidelines for implementation of the ISM Code” 
were only moderately in support of such statement, only 28 % of respondents are of 
the opinion that such a level of detail can not be adopted in a guidelines to a 
legislative tool. 
 
Figure 49 Total response to (Q 22) 
 
The support of respondents to the notion that business best practice is a valuable 
source for providing guidelines to compliance with the ISM Code, even if the level 
of detail will naturally be greater, is evident in the response to this question. 
 
5.8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The initial literature review related to TMSA has proven to be difficult in terms of 
the availability of academic references related to the topic of this study, nevertheless, 
an examination of conference proceedings related to the implementation of TMSA 
has provided a valuable source on the industries attitude and reaction to TMSA. 
 
Nevertheless, many of the issues raised in these proceedings have been addressed in 
the questionnaire and individual observations were reported in this study, it is found 
that the initial reaction of the industry to the introduction of TMSA varies to a 
considerable extent from the current attitude towards the adoption of business best 
practice as a basis for safety management tools. 
 
However, the coexistence of common “legislative” rules and regulation concerning 
safety management as well as guidelines based on business best practice is an 
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integral part of the formula towards a proper adoption of these legislative tools. This 
is to prevent the ship from becoming a library of broad rules and standards written in 
the most generic format possible taking the shear size of varieties in the shipping 
industry into consideration, although the guidelines on the implementation of the 
ISM Code do go some way into providing a common interpretation of the provisions 
of the code, relating these guidelines to practical measures, which have been tried 
and tested by industry leaders, is a mechanism worthy of consideration. 
 
Although the questionnaire exercise undertaken for the benefit of this study was 
fortunate to have had a considerable participation, and some observation of great 
interest were made, some limitations to that approach has been identified in chapter 
five of this study. Future studies addressing similar scopes could benefit from taking 
these limitations into consideration, in particular the undertaking of a pilot survey 
prior to the distribution of the main survey. Future researchers are advised to keep in 
mind the industries reluctance to be quoted on their criticism of a commercially 
sensitive issue as the confirmation to TMSA.   
 
Although the conclusion of every issue addressed in the questionnaire exercise has 
been examined together with any limitations attached to such conclusions; the 
following list provide the most significant findings of the questionnaire exercise: 
1. The number of responses received during the questionnaire exercise, together 
with the diversity observed in demographic of respondents, attaches a special 
significance to the results observed. 
2. The general attitude of respondents towards the effective impact of both the ISM 
Code and TMSA has been positive. Although the industries attitude towards the 
implementation of the ISM Code has been addressed in other studies, the 
relationship between the respondents’ attitude towards the ISM Code and TMSA 
explored in this study is equally significant. 
3. Despite the early difficulties experienced in attempting to comparatively assess 
two totally different management tools, the results observed in the questionnaire 
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show that respondents were largely in agreement with the approach of this study 
and consequently have provided a valuable contribution to the questionnaire. 
4. Generally, respondents are largely in support of adopting the principles of TMSA 
to other industries, i.e. other than the oil tanker industry. 
5. Data gathered has failed to provide any conclusive observation from the 
respondents’ attitude towards: 
5.1. Whether TMSA is easier to implement on a new company rather than on an 
established company. And; 
5.2. Whether internal audit of SMS is better than self-assessment in TMSA. 
6. Nevertheless, respondents have attached considerable general support towards 
the following aspects: 
6.1. Implementing clear guidance based on businesses best practice is easier to 
follow than generic regulations. 
6.2. ISM had a good impact on good operators; the same applies to TMSA 
6.3. Confirming to TMSA is an aid to compliance with ISM. 
6.4. TMSA is the way forward for the shipping industry to move beyond 
minimum compliance attitude in relation to safety management and 
environment protection from ism supporters 
7. Additionally, specific groups of respondents have noticeably provided stronger 
support (compared to other groups within the same category) to some aspects 
addressed in the questionnaire. Such as: 
7.1. The particular support from respondents involved in the management of the 
ISM Code in their organisations and involved in the shore based 
management of ships including tankers and other types of ships to the notion 
that an increased level of detail in regulations concerning safety management 
increases the chances of compliance with the spirit of the regulations. 
7.2. Respondents of the view that the ISM Code had a positive impact on the 
shipping industry have strongly supported that the approach of TMSA is 
more structured and methodical than the ISM Code. 
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7.3. Respondents involved in the management of the ISM Code for the last 6 to 
10 years, i.e. after the introduction of TMSA has supported that the level of 
detail in TMSA can be matched with Guidance published by the IMO on 
compliance and implementation of the ISM Code. 
8. Last but not least, addressing a practical suggestion to improve on the current 
implementation of safety management standards, respondents have generally 
supported that the guidelines for the implementation of ISM code issued by the 
IMO could benefit from the TMSA systematic approach 
 
In addition, future research into this subject could quantitatively address the current 
implementation of the leading and lagging safety indicators of TMSA and the ISM 
Code. This type of study combined with results observed in this study could provide 
an insight on how could positive attitudes to ISM and TMSA yield tangible 
operational safety benefits. In other words, studying the mechanism of translating the 
positive attitude of the industry towards safety management tools into operational 
benefits at the sharp end. 
 
Finally, the merits of adopting the self-assessment approach of TMSA in comparison 
to the advantages of conducting an effective internal audit of the safety management 
system of the company, can be closely related to the continues improvement cycles 
of both TMSA and the ISM Code respectively. Nevertheless, in either case, the level 
of Shore based management commitment, competence, attitudes and motivation of 
individuals, at all levels, in the company and on board ships are the basis for success 
in any exercise. 
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Appendices 
7. Appendix A TMSA 2004/2008 Gap Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
- FOR SAFE TRANSPORT, CLEANER SEAS AND FREE COMPETITION -  
08 July 2008 
Our Ref.: HS-40063/1650000 
TMSA 2004/2008 Gap Analysis 
 
Introduction: 
 
Further to the recent release of the revised Tanker Management Self Assessment (TMSA 2), 
INTERTANKO has produced the following spreadsheet which aims to assist members identify 
where changes have been made within the revised TMSA (2008 version), as compared with the 
initial TMSA 2004 version. 
 
Explanation: 
 
1. Using TMSA 2004 as the base document, each element and sub-element is listed in the left 
hand column on each page. 
2. The right hand column on each page indicates: 
! if changes have been made to the 2004 element  
! if no changes have been made to the 2004 element 
! if the 2004 element has been moved to another reference within TMSA 2008 without 
changes 
! if the 2004 element has been moved to another reference within TMSA 2008 with 
changes 
! The elements highlighted in yellow are changes that have been made by OCIMF which 
reflect suggestions made by INTERTANKO following our letter to OCIMF requesting 
consideration of various elements after consulting our TMSA working Group the 
vetting Committee, Environmental Committee, and Safety technical Committee 
(ISTEC).   
 
3. The numbering system used in the spreadsheet is as follows: 
! Each of the twelve elements is numbered 1 to 12 
! The sub elements are numbered “.1”, “.2 “.3” etc within each element. For example,   
TMSA 1A “Management, Leadership & Accountability” sub-element 2, “Safety 
and environmental excellence are fully understood and supported by vessel and 
shore-based management teams” is numbered “1A 2.1” in the spreadsheet. 
 
Disclaimer 
Whilst INTERTANKO has used its best endeavours to ensure this information is accurate we can 
not accept any responsibility for any errors and each company should verify its own assessment 
accordingly against the final TMSA 2 document. 
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8. Appendix B Examination of Demographics of responders  
01) Gender 
 
 
 
02) Age 
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03) What is your organization's role in the shipping industry? 
 
 
 
04) Do you have seafaring experience? 
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05) Are you involved in the shore-based management of ships? 
 
 
 
06) Do you have management capacity over ISM implementation in your 
organization? 
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07) Do you have a role in TMSA in your organization? 
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9. Appendix C Unfiltered Results of Questionnaire 
08) How effective would you rate the positive impact of the ISM code on 
the Shipping industry? 
 
 
 
09) Do you believe TMSA had a positive impact on the tanker industry? 
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10) The approach of the TMSA is more structured and methodical than 
the ISM Code? 
 
 
 
11) TMSA is the way forward for the shipping industry to move beyond 
minimum compliance attitude in relation to safety management and 
environment protection? 
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12) TMSA is easier to implement on a new company rather than on an 
established company? 
 
 
13) Other industries could benefit from the implementation of a safety 
management tool such as TMSA for non-tankers? 
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14) Implementing clear guidance based on businesses best practice is 
easier to follow than generic regulations? 
 
 
15) Confirming to TMSA is an aid to compliance with ISM? 
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16) ISM had a good impact on good operators; the same applies to 
TMSA? 
 
 
 
17) TMSA is a voluntary safety management tool that can be compared 
in its approach or in it’s effect on tanker industry to the implementation 
of ISM. 
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18) The TMSA is a management tool that is subject to interpretation by 
vetting inspectors as much as the ISM code is subject to interpretation by 
Auditors? 
 
19) The level of detail in TMSA can be matched with Guidance 
published by the IMO on compliance and implementation of the ISM 
Code? 
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20) Internal audit of SMS is better than self assessment in TMSA? 
 
 
 
21) Increased level of detail in regulations concerning safety 
management increases the chances of compliance with the spirit of the 
regulations? 
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22) How could we improve on the ISM Code in terms of compliance 
with lessons learned from reaction of the tanker industry to TMSA? 
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10. Appendix D Cross tabulation of general response 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Count of Res
Q11 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 17 16 3 36
Agree 38 73 22 2 1 136
Neutral 15 36 30 1 1 83
Disagree 1 12 1 2 16
Strongly 2 2
Grand Total 71 137 56 5 4 273
Count of Res
Q12 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 4 11 5 20
Agree 22 34 12 2 1 71
Neutral 28 46 28 1 2 105
Disagree 11 41 10 1 63
Strongly 4 2 1 1 1 9
Grand Total 69 134 56 5 4 268
Count of Res
Q13 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 8 19 3 30
Agree 37 73 25 1 1 137
Neutral 20 37 18 2 1 78
Disagree 3 7 9 1 20
Strongly 1 1 1 2 5
Grand Total 68 137 56 5 4 270
Count of Res
Q14 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 13 22 8 43
Agree 45 89 30 4 1 169
Neutral 8 25 16 1 1 51
Disagree 1 4 3 8
Strongly 2 2
Grand Total 67 140 57 5 4 273
Count of Res
Q15 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 16 11 6 33
Agree 38 83 24 2 1 148
Neutral 12 30 19 3 1 65
Disagree 3 11 7 21
Strongly 1 2 3
Grand Total 69 136 56 5 4 270
Count of Res
Q16 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 21 16 3 40
Agree 34 94 22 2 1 153
Neutral 9 23 24 1 1 58
Disagree 3 5 4 2 14
Strongly 2 2 4
Grand Total 67 138 55 5 4 269
Q8
Q8
Q8
Q8
Cross Tabulation of Question 8 and question 11 to 22
Q8
Q8
Count of Res
Q17 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 7 6 4 17
Agree 37 79 19 2 1 138
Neutral 19 36 26 3 1 85
Disagree 6 11 4 21
Strongly 4 2 6
Grand Total 69 136 53 5 4 267
Count of Res
Q18 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 10 12 7 29
Agree 31 67 19 4 1 122
Neutral 20 43 23 1 1 88
Disagree 8 11 5 24
Strongly 3 2 5
Grand Total 69 136 54 5 4 268
Count of Res
Q19 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 5 4 4 13
Agree 38 59 19 2 1 119
Neutral 19 56 27 2 1 105
Disagree 6 16 4 1 27
Strongly 2 1 2 5
Grand Total 68 137 55 5 4 269
Count of Res
Q20 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 11 7 1 19
Agree 21 38 6 3 1 69
Neutral 24 58 36 2 1 121
Disagree 12 32 12 56
Strongly 3 1 2 6
Grand Total 68 138 56 5 4 271
Count of Res
Q21 Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
Strongly Agree 10 8 4 22
Agree 37 65 22 2 1 127
Neutral 12 39 17 1 1 70
Disagree 6 20 8 2 36
Strongly 1 6 2 2 11
Grand Total 66 138 53 5 4 266
Count of Res
Q22 Very Effective Effective Neutral Grand Total
1 4 6 7 17
2 9 20 2 31
3 1 3 1 5
Grand Total 14 29 10 53
Q8
Q8
Q8
Q8
Q8
Q8
Count of Res
Q11 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit Grand Total
Strongly Agree 30 4 34
Agree 68 52 6 126
Neutral 12 28 3 43
Disagree 4 7 5 16
Strongly Disagree 1 1
Grand Total 114 91 15 220
Count of Res
Q12 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit Grand Total
Strongly Agree 9 10 19
Agree 33 27 4 64
Neutral 33 31 4 68
Disagree 31 20 5 56
Strongly Disagree 5 2 1 8
Grand Total 111 90 14 215
Count of Res
Q13 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit Grand Total
Strongly Agree 22 6 28
Agree 67 45 6 118
Neutral 15 30 4 49
Disagree 8 9 2 19
Strongly Disagree 3 3
Grand Total 112 90 15 217
Count of Res
Q20 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit
Strongly Agree 8 8 1 Grand Total
Agree 30 21 7 58
Neutral 41 41 6 88
Disagree 30 21 51
Strongly Disagree 4 1 5
Grand Total 113 91 15 219
Count of Res
Q14 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit
Strongly Agree 20 9 4 Grand Total
Agree 75 63 5 143
Neutral 14 16 4 34
Disagree 3 4 1 8
Strongly Disagree 1 1
Grand Total 112 92 15 219
Q15 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit
Strongly Agree 21 8 1 Grand Total
Agree 70 56 3 129
Neutral 13 20 4 37
Disagree 8 6 5 19
Strongly Disagree 2 2
Grand Total 112 90 15 217
Cross Tabulation of Question 9 and question 11 to 22
Q9
Q9
Q9
Q9
Q9
Q9
Count of Res
Q16 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit Grand Total
Strongly Agree 25 10 1 36
Agree 73 55 6 134
Neutral 8 18 5 31
Disagree 5 6 2 13
Strongly Disagree 1 1 2
Grand Total 112 89 15 216
Count of Res
Q21 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit Grand Total
Strongly Agree 10 8 1 19
Agree 59 41 6 106
Neutral 20 27 3 50
Disagree 20 7 3 30
Strongly Disagree 1 6 2 9
Grand Total 110 89 15 214
Count of Res
Count of Res
Q17 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit Grand Total
Strongly Agree 11 5 16
Agree 71 49 4 124
Neutral 19 28 5 52
Disagree 9 8 2 19
Strongly Disagree 2 3 5
Grand Total 112 90 14 216
Count of Res
Q18 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit Grand Total
Strongly Agree 15 9 2 26
Agree 55 47 5 107
Neutral 27 28 5 60
Disagree 15 3 2 20
Strongly Disagree 1 2 1 4
Grand Total 113 89 15 217
Count of Res
Q19 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit Grand Total
Strongly Agree 10 2 1 13
Agree 53 49 3 105
Neutral 31 33 7 71
Disagree 15 7 3 25
Strongly Disagree 2 1 3
Grand Total 111 91 15 217
Count of Res
Q22 Yes definitely possibly a lot of trouble with no real benefit Grand Total
1 4 10 14
2 18 9 2 29
3 1 3 1 5
Grand Total 23 22 3 48
Q9
Q9
Q9
Q9
Q9
Q9
Q9
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11. Appendix E Selected comments received 
 
1. TMSA is a structured management tool for the tanker industry specific. A 
management tool to support ISM implementation is definitely beneficial provided it 
can be moulded to apply to all ship types and sizes 
 
2. The effort in improving the safety of ships should focus on building a safety 
culture. It is doubtful that this can only be achieved in exclusively stricter and more 
detailed regulations. In the end it will only degrade into ticking of boxes. On the 
other hand it is much easier for the regulators (and management) to come up with 
checklists than to change the attitude towards safety 
 
3. A better-trained and knowledgeable mariner is more effective than a well-
documented ISM implementation. 
 
4. The TMSA is simply a cream on top of the ISM Code cake. 
 
5. There is a fundamental difference between self-assessment culture and 
external audit (as in ISM). TMSA audits by oil majors defeat the concept of 'self'-
assessment. Best industry practices of TMSA tie in nicely with continuous 
improvement concept of ISM. It is not the ISM Code or TMSA that needs 
improvement as much as the tanker operator's commitment to its spirit and the 
commercial benefits that accrue from such commitment. 
 
6. TMSA is the way forward when applied to Vetting - There is too much 
duality with the tanker industries needing one agreed approach. CDI, SIRE 
(including gas) is different systems and objective approach versus a more subjective 
approach. ISM to a greater extent has resulted in a dumping down of the industry. 
Good operator need not fear regulation and can achieve good results at anytime when 
required to be audited or vetted. 
 
7. ISM and TMSA are not directly comparable as ISM is mandatory while 
TMSA is in theory not 
 
8. To improve the effectiveness of the ISM or TMSA a direct links between 
leading and lagging indicators must exist 
 
9. I will try to learn more about TMSA, because of your presentation here. 
 
10. ISM and TMSA will benefit good operators but bad operators are the ones 
that need to be held to compliance. This will never improve until there is more 
accountability and severe punitive action for substandard vessels and vessel 
operators and those people who enable such substandard to exist and flourish 
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11. The objectives of both the ISM Code and the TMSA are safety and 
environmental protection. While these goals are laudable, the additional layers of 
resources needed to implement them add to the cost of ship operations. It would be 
worthwhile to consider a single regulatory regime encompassing all ships, with 
appendices for various types of ships. A conscientious ship operator is often held 
hostage to excessively high standards, simply because these standards were deemed 
to be the best practice. Best practices may vary from situation to situation and 
practicality, logic and pragmatism are often sacrificed at the altar of mandatory 
compliance. 
 
12. Implementing TMSA requires a lot of resources within a company. Small 
ship management companies will find it difficult to comply. The ISM Code in it's 
present format is good enough for shipping in general. 
 
13. Such kind of strict KPI to be applied must be introduced to make ship 
manager comply with ISM's spirit for dry ship too 
 
14. TMSA focus on a series of procedures and records where auditors and 
company management can see that they have adhered to what "experts" deemed as 
the ideal practice to improve safety on ships. However, did the author of the TMSA 
and the ISM realize the intangible costs in implementing these codes? 
 
15. Increasingly, we have seen a shortage of manpower ashore largely because of 
the need for additional manpower to micro-manage the fleet. Empowerment of the 
Master and his officers are a thing of the past. 
16. When market is very high, we see Charterers being driven by commercial 
pressure to take in older tonnages. So why this emphasis on quality when Charterers 
are unable to adhere to their own philosophies when the market is against them? 
 
17. After auditing shipping companies on behalf of Oil Major in my past job and 
now that I am back into Ship Management, sad to say its the implementation of the 
code and commitment from TOP management that is the missing. There would not 
have been a requirement for TMSA, if ISM was being strictly followed & the ISM 
auditors took a more in-depth role. 
 
18. TMSA is too detailed for small companies who lack experienced shore 
management. For example in China where I am based TMSA is too difficult for 
Chinese operators to implement. The problem is that the shore management prepares 
the entire ISM documentation needed for review by vetting consultants so the ship 
staff have little part in the process of implementation and its use for continuous 
improvement. 
 
19. TMSA is a powerful tool and it offers a good operator a guide to best industry 
practices. Management commitment and TMSA is a great combination for continual 
improvement. Strongly feel TMSA is the way forward - a step beyond ISM. 
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20. There are three aspects which dilutes the effort of the very concept of TMSA 
1. Demand of officers and crew relative to lower supply - This gives rise poor quality 
crew and officers available. Which in turn makes all the effort and cost of TMSA just 
paper compliance and not actual implementation on board or Shore management 2. 
Owners and charterers lose out more often than not, because Oil major can accept 
and reject vessels on grounds that in today’s market are difficult, e.g. - manning 
matrix requirement etc 3. Cost of operating vessel increases substantially with little 
to very little gain actually 
 
21. have been sailing on oil tankers from 1992 till 2008 and have been witness to 
the ISM and TMSA introduction on ships. It would not be far from the truth to say 
that many seafarers presently sailing on ships are not adequately aware of the various 
provisions of the ISM Code or for that matter, the TMSA. 
 
22. ISM code is mostly generic, TMSA establishes " Benchmarking of 
Companies" but there are no Published " Benchmarks" so there is confusion in the 
industry in comparing standards. Another experience we had is that Vetting 
organizations have used TMSA by feeding data into their own Computer programs to 
churn out company analysis, which when we meet them face to face and explain, 
their results are not reflective on the actual situation which then puts some good 
operators who are honest and not blindly increasing their TMSA Numbers, at a 
disadvantage. Some small operators may not require achieving the highest level in a 
particular TMSA sub element, as it may not be applicable/feasible, and that also 
affects operators rating from their Computer analysis results as we demonstrated to 
one oil major and they agreed on that. 
 
